Global trade governance and the challenges of African activism in the Doha development agenda negotiations

Global Society

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 83-101

  Donna, Lee ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BILATERAL AGREEMENT; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TRADE PERFORMANCE; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

AFRICA;

EID: 84857065788     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: 1469798X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2011.629990     Document Type: Article

References (121)

1. James Brassett and Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Crisis is Governance: Sub-prime, the Traumatic Event, and Bare Life", Global Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2012), pp. 19-42
2. Liam Clegg, "Post-crisis Reforms at the IMF: Learning to be (Seen to be) a Development Partner?", Ibid., pp. 61-81
3. Manuela Moschella, "IMF Surveillance in Crisis. The Past, Present, and Future of the Reform Process", Ibid., pp. 43-60
4. Lena Rethel, "This Time is Different! The Shifting Boundaries of Emerging Market Debt", Ibid., pp. 123-143.
5. WTO, "Trade Value Still up by about 25% in the First Half of 2010", Press Release, 1 September 2010, available: (accessed 9 September 2010).
6. Russia is not a member of the WTO and so I use "BICs" rather than the more recognised "BRICs". For detailed analysis of the role of the BICs see Amrita Narlikar, "New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global Trade Governance", International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (2010), pp. 717-728.
7. For detailed analysis of Africa in the WTO see Michael F. Jensen and Peter Gibbon, "Africa and the WTO Doha Round: An Overview", Development Policy Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007), pp. 5-24
8. Donna Lee, "Bringing an Elephant into the Room: Small African State Diplomacy in the WTO", in Andrew F. Cooper and Tim M. Shaw (eds.), The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 195-206
9. Richard E. Mshomba, Africa and the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10. Ian Taylor, "Globalisation Studies and the Developing World: Making International Political Economy Truly Global", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1025-1042.
11. For a full discussion of this point see Will Brown, Sophie Harmon, Stephen Hurt, Donna Lee and Karen Smith, "New Directions in International Relations in Africa", Roundtable: Commonwealth Journal of International Studies, Vol. 98. No. 402 (2009), pp. 263-267.
12. For an excellent review of these literatures see Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay", Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2004), pp. 229-244.
13. Rorden Wilkinson, "Language, Power and Multilateral Trade Negotiations", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2009), pp. 597-619.
14. A phrase I borrow from James C. Scott's Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985)
15. See also Jason C. Sharman, "The Agency of Peripheral Actors: Small State Tax Havens and International Regimes as Weapons of the Weak", in John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (eds.), The Everyday Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 45-62.
16. Sharman, op. cit.
17. There are four trade-related issues that are referred to as the "Singapore Issues": Government procurement, investment, competition and facilitation.
18. For a detailed discussion of the diplomatic strategies of African states in the DDA see Donna Lee and Nicki Smith, "Small State Discourses in the International Political Economy", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 7 (2010), pp. 1091-1105
19. Lee, "Bringing an Elephant into the Room", op. cit.
20. The author held 24 open-ended interviews during March 2010, June 2010 and July 2011 with various officials based in African missions in Geneva and Brussels, as well as officials from the African Union, the WTO, UNCTAD and key non-governmental organisations who work with the Africa Group in the WTO. These interviews were conducted on the basis that interviewees would remain anonymous and quotes would not be directly attributed, as is customary practice.
21. For detailed analysis of the Cancun ministerial meeting
22. see Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, "Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-mortem", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004), pp. 447-460.
23. For a detailed analysis of the negotiations up to and including the Hong Kong Ministerial see Donna Lee and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.), The WTO after Hong Kong: Prospects for, and Progress in, the Doha Development Agenda (London: Routledge, 2007).
24. Special safeguard measures are a tariff mechanism that protects poor farmers by allowing some developing countries and least-developed countries to set a tariff when prices fall or when imports surge. For details
25. see James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, "What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)?", Paper presented at the conference "Ten Years of the 'War against Poverty': What Have We Learned since 2000
26. What Should We Do 2010-2020?" Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester, 8-10 September 2010.
27. For detailed discussion of the development content of the DDA negotiations
28. "Ministerial Declaration. Adopted on 14 November, 2001", WTO, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, 20 November 2001.
29. Scott and Wilkinson, "What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain", op. cit., p. 12.
30. The Hindu, "WTO Members for Concluding the Round 2011", 9 January 2011, available: (accessed 11 February 2011).
31. The WTO website provides a useful timeline of the DDA negotiations, available:
32. For more detailed discussion of the course of the DDA negotiations from a developing country perspective written by the head of the South African trade delegation in Geneva, see Faisal Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation: Developing Countries in the Doha Round (Jaipur: CUTS International and Friederich Ebert Stiftung, 2009)
33. See also James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson "What Happened to Doha in Geneva? Re-engineering the WTO's Image while Missing Key Opportunities", European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2010), pp. 141-153.
34. Most of Pascal Lamy's recent speeches are attempts to create new momentum in the negotiations. See
35. The "Derbez Text" is available on the WTO website:
36. "Analysis of the Twenty Eight Specific Proposals, Communication by Kenya on Behalf of the Africa Group", WTO, TN/CTD/W/29, 9 June 2006, p. 25.
37. "Modalities for Negotiations on Agricultural Commodity Issues. Proposal Submitted by the Africa Group to the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture", WTO, TN/AG/GEN/18, 8 June 2006.
38. See Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade (London: Routledge, 2006)
39. See also John W. Evans, The Kennedy Trade Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) for further details of deadlock in the GATT in the 1960s.
40. Peter Collier, "Why the WTO is Deadlocked and What Can Be Done about It', The World Economy, Vol. 29, No. 10 (2006), pp. 1423-1449
41. Lee and Wilkinson, op. cit
42. Amrita Narlikar and Peter Van Houten, "Know the Enemy: Uncertainty and Deadlock in the WTO", in Amrita Narlikar (ed.), Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 142-163
43. John Odell, "Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle and Doha", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 273-299
44. Wilkinson, The WTO, op. cit.
45. TheWarwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (Coventry: University of Warwick, 2007)
46. Alasdair R. Young, "Transatlantic Intransigence in the Doha Round: Domestic Politics and the Difficulty of Compromise", in Narlikar, Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations, op. cit.
47. See in particular Narlikar, "New Powers in the Club", op. cit.
48. The Warwick Commission, op. cit.
49. Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation, op. cit.
50. See Wilkinson, The WTO, op. cit.
51. See, for example, Jennifer Clapp, "The WTO Agriculture Negotiations and the Global South", in Lee andWilkinson, op. cit., pp. 37-55
52. Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita, "The Balance of Power in WTO Decision-making: TowardsWeighted Voting in Legislative Response", Aussenwirtshaft, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2003), pp. 171-214
53. Joost Pauwelyn, "The Transformation ofWorld Trade", Michigan Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-69
54. Amrita Narlikar, "The Ministerial Process and Power Dynamics in the World Trade Organisation: Understanding Failure from Seattle to Cancun", New Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2004), pp. 413-428
55. Amrita Narlikar, "New Powers in the Club", op. cit.; Robert HunterWade, "The Ring Master of Doha", New Left Review, Vol. 25, January-February 2004, pp. 146-152.
56. Robert Hunter Wade, "The Ring Master of Doha", New Left Review, Vol. 25, January-February 2004, pp. 146-152.
57. see also Peter Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO", International Negotiation, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), pp. 79-109
58. Jeffrey J. Scott (ed.), The WTO after Seattle (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000)
59. Richard Steinberg, "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO", International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002), pp. 339-374.
60. For full discussion of this see Bernard.MHoekman and Micheal M. Kosteki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
61. For detailed discussion of these new developing country powers in the WTO see Narlikar, "New Powers in the Club", op. cit.
62. For details of the G20 in the WTO see Ian Taylor, "The Periphery Strikes Back: The G20 at the WTO"
63. Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, "The New Politics of Confrontation: Developing Countries at Cancun and Beyond", Global Society, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2006), pp. 415-433
64. Amrita Narlikar and Brendan Vickers (eds.), Leadership and Change in the Multilateral Trading System (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009).
65. See Clapp, op. cit.
66. Ian Taylor, "The Periphery Strikes Back", op. cit.
67. Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, "The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO", The World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 27 (2004), pp. 947-966.
68. Lee and Smith, "Small State Discourses", op. cit.
69. See Faisal Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation, op. cit.
70. Bhagirath Lal Das, The Current Negotiations in the WTO: Options, Opportunities and Risks for Developing Countries (London: Zed Books, 2005)
71. Kevin P. Gallagher, "Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2008), pp. 62-85.
72. Donna Lee, "The Cotton Club: The Africa Group in the WTO"
73. See also Elinor L. Heinisch, "West Africa versus the United States on Cotton Subsidies: How, Why and What Next?", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2006), pp. 251-274.
74. Narlikar and van Houten, op. cit.
75. See also John Odell, Negotiating the World Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000)
76. John Odell (ed.), Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
77. Narlikar and Van Houten, op. cit., p. 148.
78. Again, see Checkel, op. cit. for a summary analysis of these literatures.
79. Robert B. Zoellick, "AmericaWill NotWait for theWon't Do Countries", Financial Times, London, 22 September 2003, p. 15.
80. For a previous detailed analysis of the "won't do" strategy of developing and least-developed countries in the DDA
81. see Lee and Smith, "Small State Discourses", op. cit.
82. Note that this Lee and Smith article focuses on the discourses of smallness rather than the discourses of development in order to analyse the influence of small states in the international political economy.
83. See, for example, Roman Grynberg (ed.), WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multilateral Trade System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
84. Lee, "Bringing an Elephant into the Room", op. cit.
85. For an alternative view that sees low levels of African engagement in the Doha Round see Jensen and Gibbon, op. cit.
86. Most African countries became members of the GATTas colonies of the signatory states. Membership simply entailed the extension of GATT rights and obligations to African countries rather than any active participation in GATT negotiations.
87. Mshomba, Africa and The World Trade Organization op.cit.
88. Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott, "Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassessment", World Trade Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2008), pp. 473-510.
89. See Joseph Senona, Compilation of the Formal African Proposals to the WTO (Harare: SEATINI; Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005).
90. It should, however, be remembered that many least-developed states still have inadequate capacity to engage in WTO processes in any meaningful way.
91. Jensen and Gibbon, op. cit., p. 5.
92. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
93. Lee, "The Cotton Club", op. cit.
94. Sharman, op cit.
95. See, for example, the following Africa Group submissions: "Analysis of the Twenty Eight Agreement Specific Proposals. Submission by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group", WTO, TN/CTD/W/29, 9 June 2006
96. "Communication from the Africa Group. Operationalizing Technical Assistance and Capacity Building in Trade Facilitation", WTO TN/TF/W/56, 22 July 2005; "Review and Clarification on the Green Box. Communication by the Africa Group", WTO TN/AG/GEN/15, 6 April 2006; "Communication from Benin on behalf of the Africa Group. Implementation the Technical Assistance and Capacity Building and Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) Mandates of Annex D of the July 2004 Framework", WTO TN/TF/W/95, 9 May 2006.
97. James Tijmes-Lhl, "Consenus and Majority Voting in the WTO", World Trade Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2009), p. 420.
98. For details of the Green Room process see Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World on International Trade Negotiations; The Lessons of Cancun, updated ed. (London: Zed Books, 2004).
99. Tijmes-Lhl, op. cit., p. 421.
100. Interviews with African officials in African missions, the African Union, as well as staff from the ICTSD, South Centre, UNCTAD, Geneva, March and June 2010.
101. Interview with WTO officials, Geneva, March 2010.
102. Interviews with African officials in African missions, the African Union Mission as well as staff from the ICTSD, South Centre, UNCTAD, Geneva, March and June 2010.
103. Oxfam, "Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Subsidies on Africa", Briefing paper No. 30 (London: Oxfam, 2002).
104. Lee and Smith, "Small State Discourses", op. cit.
105. Interviews with officials from African missions, Geneva, March and June 2010.
106. For example, Cape Verde, Namibia and Tunisia have just one representative in Geneva. Data from WTO Directory, March 2009.
107. In the Kenyan Mission, the staffing levels rose from four in 2006 to eleven in 2009. In the Burkina Faso Mission, staffing levels also rose fromfour in 2006 to eleven in 2009, making their Geneva Mission the same size at that of Brazil and South Korea
108. See WTO Directory, 2006 and 2009 (Geneva: WTO).
109. Interviews with officials from African missions, Geneva and Brussels, June 2010.
110. Lee, "Bringing an Elephant into the Room", op. cit.
111. Mshomba, op. cit.
112. Scott and Wilkinson, "What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain", op. cit., pp. 13-14.
113. See Faisal Ismail, "An Assessment of the WTO Doha Round July-December 2008 Collapse", World Trade Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2009), pp. 579-605
114. Scott and Wilkinson, "What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain", op. cit.
115. Sharman, op. cit., p. 52.
116. For details and analysis of the growth in bilateral and regional trade agreements, see Ann Capling and Patrick Low (eds.), Governments, Non-state Actors and Trade Policy Making: Negotiating Preferentially or Multilaterally? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
117. Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, "The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements", WTO Discussion Paper No. 8 (Geneva: WTO, 2005)
118. Adrian G. Flint "The End of a 'Special Relationship'? The New EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements", Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 36, No. 119 (2009), pp. 79-92.
119. Crawford and Fiorentino, op. cit.
120. Denis M. Tull, "China's Engagements in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2006), pp. 459-479.
121. See, in particular, Flint, op. cit