How people think "if only..." about reasons for actions

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 461-483

  Walsh, Clare R ^a   Byrne, Ruth M J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148887138     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546780701382120     Document Type: Article

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