Understanding cumulative risk

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 63, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 499-515

  McCloy, Rachel ^a   Byrne, Ruth M J ^b   Johnson Laird, Philip N ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cumulative risk; Frequencies; Mental models; Probability judgment

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPREHENSION; DECISION MAKING; EPIDEMIC; HUMAN; NONPARAMETRIC TEST; RISK; RISK ASSESSMENT; STATISTICAL MODEL; STATISTICS; STUDENT; UNIVERSITY;

COMPREHENSION; DISEASE OUTBREAKS; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, STATISTICAL; RISK; RISK ASSESSMENT; STATISTICS, NONPARAMETRIC; STUDENTS; UNIVERSITIES;

EID: 77949562265     PISSN: 17470218     EISSN: 17470226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470210903024784     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Beford, T. M., & Cooke, R. (2001). Probabilistic risk analysis: Foundations and methods. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
2. Casscells, W., Schoenberger, A., & Grayboys, T. (1978). Interpretation by clinicians of clinical labora- tory reports. New England Journal of Clinical Medicine, 299, 999-1000.
3. Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1996). Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty. Cognition, 58, 1-73.
4. Diamond, W. D. (1990). Effects of describing long- term risks as cumulative or non-cumulative. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 11(4), 405-419.
5. Doyle, J. K. (1997). Judging cumulative risk. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 27(6), 500-524.
6. Eddy, D. M. (1982). Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
7. Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J., Perham, N., Over, D. E., & Thompson, V. A. (2000). Frequency versus probability formats in statistical word problems. Cognition, 78, 247-276.
8. Gigerenzer, G., & Hoffrage, U. (1995). How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats. Psychological Review, 102(4), 684-704.
9. Girotto, V., & Gonzalez, M. (2001). Solving probabil- istic and statistical problems: A matter of infor- mation structure and question form. Cognition, 78, 247-276.
10. Girotto, V., & Gonzalez, M. (2002). Chances and fre- quencies in probabilistic reasoning: Rejoinder to Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss & Martingnon. Cognition, 84(3), 353-359.
11. Hammerton, M. (1973). A case of radical probability estimation, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101, 252-254.
12. Hoffrage, U., Gigerenzer, G., Krauss, S., & Martingnon, L. (2002). Representation facilitates reasoning: What natural frequencies are and what they are not. Cognition, 84(3), 343-352.
13. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd.
14. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678.
15. Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Sonino-Legrenzi, M., & Caverni, J.-P. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106(1), 62-88.
16. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
17. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). Evidential impact of base rates. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
18. Knäuper, B., Kornik, R., Atkinson, K., Guberman, C., & Aydin, C. (2005). Motivation influences the underestimation of cumulative risk. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(11), 1511-1523.
19. Koehler, J. J. (1996). The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative and methodological chal- lenges. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 1-53.
20. Macchi, L. (1995). Pragmatic aspects of the base-rate fallacy. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A, 188-207.
21. Macchi, L. (2000). Partitive formulation of information in probabilistic problems: Beyond heur- istics and frequency format explanations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82, 217-236.
22. Shaklee, H., & Fischhoff, B. (1990). The psychology of contraceptive surprises: Cumulative risk and contra- ceptive effectiveness. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 20, 385-403.
23. Sloman, S. A, Over, D., Slovak, L., & Stibel, J. M. (2003). Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 296-309.
24. Slovic, P. (2000). What does it mean to know a cumu- lative risk? Adolescents' perceptions of short-term and long-term consequences of smoking. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 259-266.
25. Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Accident probabilities and seat-belt usage: A psycho- logical perspective. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 10,281-285.
26. Svenson, O. (1984).Cognitiveprocessesinjudgingcumu- lative riskoverdifferent periods of time. Organisational Behavior and Human Performance, 33, 22-41.
27. Svenson, O. (1985). Cognitive strategies in a complex judgment task: Analyses of concurrent verbal reports and judgments of cumulative risk over different exposure times. Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 36, 1-15.
28. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.