Perfect and imperfect real-time monitoring in a minimum-effort game

Experimental Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 71-88

  Deck, Cary ^a   Nikiforakis, Nikos ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Circle network; Imperfect monitoring; Information uncertainty; Real time monitoring

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856327282     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9289-1     Document Type: Article

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