Compliance with the Anti-trafficking Protocol

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 249-265

  Cho, Seo Young ^a   Vadlamannati, Krishna Chaitanya ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Compliance; F 59; F22; F53; Human trafficking; International anti trafficking law

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855801229     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.12.003     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. Akee, R., Basu, A.K., Bedi, A.S., Chau, N.H., 2010. Determinants of trafficking in women and children: Cross-national evidence, theory and policy implications. Unpublished paper. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
2. Arellano M., Bond S. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 1991, 58:277-297.
3. Arellano M., Bover O. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 1995, 68:29-51.
4. Auriol, E., Mesnard, A., 2010. Fighting human smuggling: Legalization or repression? Unpublished paper. Department of Economics, University of Toulouse, Toulouse.
5. Avdeyeva, O., 2010. Trafficking in persons: Why do states comply with international treaties? Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science. Loyola University, Chicago.
6. Baetschmann G., Staub K.E., Winkelmann R. Consistent estimation of the fixed effects ordered logit model. Working Paper no. 4 2011, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich.
7. Bartilow, H., 2010. Gender representation and international compliance against human trafficking. Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science, the University of Kentucky, Kentucky.
8. Belser P. Forced labour and human trafficking: estimating the profits. Working Paper no. 42 2005, International Labour Office, Geneva.
9. Blundell R., Bond S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 1998, 87:115-143.
10. Bound J., Jaeger D., Baker R. Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association 1995, 90:443-450.
11. Chattopadhyay R., Duflo E. Women as policy makers: evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. Econometrica 2004, 72:1409-1443.
12. Cho S.-Y. International human rights treaty to change social patterns: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (Cege) Discussion Paper no. 93 2010, Goettingen.
13. Cho S.-Y. Integrating equality: globalization, women's rights, and human trafficking. Courant Research Centre: Poverty, Equity and Growth Discussion Paper no. 73 2011, Goettingen.
14. Cho S.-Y., Dreher A., Neumayer E. The spread of anti-trafficking policies: evidence from a new index. CESifo Working Paper no. 3376 2011, Munich.
15. Cooray A., Potrafke N. Gender inequality in education: political institutions or culture and religion?. European Journal of Political Economy 2011, 27:268-280.
16. Council of Europe The Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2008, Brussels.
17. Cragg J., Donald S. Testing identifiability and specification in instrumental variable models. Econometric Theory 1993, 9:222-240.
18. De Soysa I., Vadlamannati K.C. Does being bound together liberate or suffocate? The effects of economic, social, and political globalization on human rights, 1981-2005. Kyklos 2010, 64:20-53.
19. Di Tommaso M., Shima I., Strom S., Bettio F. As bad as it gets: well-being deprivation of sexually exploited trafficked women. European Journal of Political Economy 2009, 25:143-162.
20. Dreher A. Does globalization affect growth? Empirical evidence from a new index. Applied Economics 2006, 38:1091-1110.
21. Dreher A., Sturm J.-E. Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?. Public Choice 2012, 151:363-397.
22. Dreher, A., Gassebner, M., Siemers, L.H.-R., Globalization, economic freedom and human rights. Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming), doi:. doi:10.1177/0022002711420962.
23. Elkins Z., Simmons B. On waves, clusters, and diffusion: a conceptual framework. Annals of American Academy (AAPSS) 2005, 598:33-51.
24. Fredette K. Revisiting the UN Protocol on human trafficking: striking balance for more effective legislation. Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 2009, 17:101-134.
25. Gassebner M., Gaston N., Lamla M. The inverse domino effect: are economic reforms contagious?. International Economic Review 2011, 52:183-200.
26. Haftner-Burton E., Tsutsui K. Human rights in a globalizing world: the paradox of empty promises. American Journal of Sociology 2005, 111:1373-1411.
27. Hahn J., Hausman J. A new specification test for the validity of instrumental variables. Econometrica 2002, 70:163-189.
28. Hahn J., Hausman J. Weak instruments: diagnosis and cures in empirical econometrics. American Economic Review 2003, 93:118-125.
29. Hathaway O. Do human rights treaties make a difference?. Yale Law Journal 2002, 111:1935-2042.
30. Hathaway O. Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2007, 51:588-621.
31. Imbens G., Angrist J. Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects. Econometrica 1994, 62:467-475.
32. Interpol http://www.interpol.int/Public/THB/.
33. Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M. Governance matters VIII: aggregate and individual governance indicators 1996-2008. Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978 2009, The World Bank, Washington DC.
34. Krasner S. Sovereignty, regimes and human rights. Regime Theory and International Relations 1993, 1-22. Clarendon Press, Oxford. P. Mayer, V. Rittberger (Eds.).
35. Lancaster T. The incidental parameter problem since 1948. Journal of Econometrics 2000, 95:391-413.
36. Leamer E. Let's take the con out of econometrics. American Economic Review 1983, 73:31-43.
37. Levine R., Renelt D.R. A sensitivity analysis of cross-county growth regressions. American Economic Review 1992, 82:942-963.
38. Marshall M.G., Jaggers K. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 2009, Center for Systematic Peace, Vienna, Virginia.
39. McGillivray M., White H. Measuring development? The UNDP's Human Development Index. Journal of International Development 1993, 5:183-192.
40. Neumayer E. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights?. Journal of Conflict Resolution 2005, 49:925-953.
41. Neumayer E., Plümper T. Spatial effects in dyadic data. International Organization 2010, 61:145-166.
42. Nickell S. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica 1981, 49:1417-1426.
43. Reuter http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66I4NQ20100719.
44. Roodman D. xtabond2: Stata module to extend xtabond dynamic panel data estimator http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s435901.html.
45. Roodman D. A short note on the theme of too many instruments. Working Paper No. 125 2007, Center for Global Development, Washington D.C.
46. Sala-i-Martin X. I just ran two million regressions. American Economic Review 1997, 87:178-183.
47. Simmons B. Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 2009, Cambridge University Press, New York U.S.A.
48. Simmons B., Elkins Z. Globalization and policy diffusion: explaining three decades of liberalization. Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition 2003, 226-304. Princeton University Press, Princeton. M. Kahler, D. Lake (Eds.).
49. Simmons B., Elkins Z. Globalization of liberalization: policy diffusion in the international political economy. American Political Science Review 2004, 98:171-189.
50. Simmons, B., Lloyd, P., 2010. Subjective frames and rational choice: transnational crime and the case of human trafficking. Unpublished paper. Department of Governance, Harvard University, Cambridge.
51. Stock J., Wright J., Yogo M. A survey of weak instruments and weak identification in generalized method of moments. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2002, 20:518-552.
52. Thacker S. The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics 1999, 52:38-75.
53. The United States Congress The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Public Law 106-386 2000, Washington D.C.
54. Torgler B. Tax morale and direct democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 2005, 21:525-531.
55. United Nations International Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (Anti-trafficking Protocol) 2000, New York.
56. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns 2006, Vienna.
57. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report on Trafficking In Persons 2009, Vienna.
58. United States Department of State Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons 2001-2010 and 2005, Washington D.C.
59. United States Senate Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Law Enforcement Treaties, testimony of Samuel M. Witten (Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State) the 108th Congress, 2nd Session (June 17th, 2004) 2004, Washington D.C.
60. Vreeland J. Political institutions and human rights: why dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention against Torture. International Organization 2008, 62:65-101.
61. Windmeijer F. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators. Journal of Econometrics 2005, 126:25-51.
62. Winer, J.M., 2004. Cops across borders: the evolution of transatlantic law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Unpublished paper. Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.
63. Wooldridge J. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 2002, MIT Press, Cambridge U.S.A.