Equivalence of input quotas and input charges under asymmetric information in agri-environmental schemes

Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 260-268

  Ozanne, Adam ^a   White, Ben ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Asymmetric and private information; Environmental policy; Incentive compatible contracts; Moral hazard; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

ABATEMENT COST; AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; MODELING; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 34249789289     PISSN: 0021857X     EISSN: 14779552     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2007.00098.x     Document Type: Article

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