Constructing accountability: Party position taking and economic voting

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 91-118

  Hellwig, Timothy ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

economic voting; partisan model; party competition; party strategies; sanctioning model; selection model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84555194998     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011422516     Document Type: Article

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