Judicial takings or due process?

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 305-368

  Pẽnalver, Eduardo M ^a   Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 82955161065     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (176)

1. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (plurality opinion).
2. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
3. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3183079.
5. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2611 ("[I]f an avulsion exposes land seaward of littoral property that had previously been submerged, that land belongs to the State even if it interrupts the littoral owner's contact with the water.").
6. 24 Id. at 2614-15 (citing his previous opinions in E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
7. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)).
8. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
9. Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247, 252 (2011) (noting that it "is sounder to analyze claims of improper judicial property declarations under a due process theory" because it would "provide some semblance of stability to property owners").
10. Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 436 (discussing the "practical considerations" that support the remedy of invalidation, rather than compensation, under the Due Process Clause).
11. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
12. Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985)).
13. D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 944-48 (2011).
14. John D. Echeverria, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., PROPERTY VALUES AND OREGON MEASURE: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION'S HARM TO PROPERTY OWNERS 37, at 5 (2007), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/ gelpi/GELPIMeasure37Report.pdf).
15. Measure 37 Database, PORTLAND ST. U., http://www.pdx.edu/ims/measure-37- database (last updated Dec. 12, 2007)). Part of the problem, however, may have been that the law required compensation to come from a fund specifically designated for the purposes of Measure 37 compensation. In William Fischel's account of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, he observed that, after the State of South Carolina was required to purchase David Lucas's waterfront property as a result of his successful inverse condemnation action, .
16. William A. Fischel, Takings and Public Choice: The Persuasion of Price, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 549, 552 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). Fischel views this as evidence of the cost-internalizing effects of compensation on government actors. See id. Vicki Been favors a more political interpretation of South Carolina's behavior, noting that, by the time it was forced to purchase the property from Lucas, the State had already significantly eased the regulatory regime that had motivated Lucas's original lawsuit in response to pressure from waterfront owners in the wake of the destructive Hurricane Hugo, a category 4 storm that severely damaged homes along the South Carolina coast in 1989.
17. Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 320-23 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
18. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
19. The facts of this hypothetical are based loosely on the New Jersey case of Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1969).
20. The facts of this hypothetical are based on Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
21. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1533 (1982).
22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (observing that a regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial use would not constitute a taking if it "inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership").
23. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003) ("A viable regulatory takings claim assumes that the government has acted to prohibit some activity that once was allowed, or at least had not been explicitly prohibited.").
24. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
25. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991).
26. Eduardo Moisés Peñnalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2252-53 (2004) ("[T]he mechanisms for protecting property owners from abusive government regulation should not be primarily judicial, but rather structural and political.").
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 50 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (quotations omitted).
28. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 1998) (holding that a county's invocation of a state Right to Farm statute, which immunized a farmer against the possibility of a nuisance suit by neighbors, constituted a "flagrantly" unconstitutional taking).
29. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252-57 (1996).
30. John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1099-102 (2000).
31. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791-92 (1995).
32. Green Int'l, Inc. v. State, 877 S.W.2d 428, 434 (Tex. App. 1994) ("The rationale for [the] scienter requirement is the idea that negligence by government agents confers no benefit on the public."). Some state constitutions expressly protect property owners from damage to their property by the State, as well as from takings.
33. Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 118-20 (1999).
34. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
35. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 279 (1992) ("[T]akings doctrine is a mess.").
36. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2169-70 (2002) (likening attempts to interpret the Takings Clause to the "physicist's hunt" for the elusive quark (citation omitted)).
37. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1984) (describing Takings Clause jurisprudence as "[b]y far the most intractable constitutional property issue").
38. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1077-97 & n.2 (1993) (reviewing the state of takings jurisprudence and collecting sources).
39. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006).
40. Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877.
41. James W. Ely Jr., Thomas Cooley, "Public Use, " and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 845.
42. William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929.
43. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934 (2003).
44. Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006).
45. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
46. Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 718 (2002) (arguing that intent to expropriate ought to be a requirement for establishing a regulatory taking). Our approach differs from Krotoszynski's in that he defines the requisite intent far more narrowly than we do. For example, he distinguishes between an intent to appropriate and an intent to regulate.
47. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984).
48. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
49. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
50. Aj Van Der Walt, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY LAW 123-28 (2005) (discussing a similar-though not identical-distinction between "deprivation" and "expropriation" in the South African Constitution).
51. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005).
52. Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 183 (1985).
53. Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (6th ed. 2003).
54. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 755 (1999).
55. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 962 (calling the notion that "just compensation" undercompensates a "truism").
56. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005).
57. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006) (questioning the conventional view that most owners are undercompensated when their property is taken by eminent domain).
58. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
60. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.").
61. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1984). Conversely, under due process (and equal protection) analysis of property regulation since the end of the Lochner era, the question has been whether there is some conceivable public purpose that would justify the regulation.
62. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993).
63. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955). But, as Justice Kennedy observes in his concurring opinionin Kelo, the difference is more apparent than real.
64. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446, 447, 450 (1985).
65. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533, 536 (1973)).
66. John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 156 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
67. Richard Kraut, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 385-86 (2002). Similarly, Aquinas considered orientation towards the common good a fundamental requirement for legality.
68. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn's Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW. 287, 331 (2010) ("The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property may not be taken by the government except for a 'public use' and upon 'just compensation.'").
69. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) ("[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.").
70. Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 387-406 (2006).
71. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (plurality opinion).
73. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009).
74. Michael A. Memoli, Senate Convicts Federal Judge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A12.
75. Richard Simon, Rangel Draws Ethics Censure, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at AA.
76. Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 635-64 (1994).
77. Richard H. Fallon Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1031-35 (2009).
78. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ("[D]ue process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in the first instance . . . .'"
79. Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972).
80. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1972).
81. James L. Huffman, Retroactivity, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1095, 1106-09 (2000). None of this suggests that courts do not apply new property rules retroactively. But when they do so act retroactively, they usually feel the need to explain why retroactive application is appropriate.
82. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 260-62 (N.Y. 1977) (calling the retroactive application of a new rule that deprives an owner of the value of his investment a violation of due process norms).
83. Franza v. Olin, 897 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807-08 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that the application of an amended adverse possession law to a fully vested claim would constitute a taking of property without just compensation).
84. Barra v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 907 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73-74 (App. Div. 2010) (holding the same without specifying the legal foundation for the nonretroactivity rule).
85. Schrader v. Schrader, 101 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (same).
86. Gorte v. Dep't of Transp., 507 N.W.2d 797, 800-01 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (same) (citing In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
87. (Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co.), 331 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Mich. 1982) (analyzing the impact of retroactivity on vested rights using a due process rubric)).
88. Quality Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Spencer, 586 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1998) (holding that, when a property owner makes substantial expenditures toward completion of a project, the owner acquires "the right to complete the development of his property in accordance with his plans as of the effective date of the new ordinance").
89. Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 170 S.E.2d 904, 909 (N.C. 1969) (same).
90. City of Dublin v. Finkes, 615 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that federal and state constitutions both "recognize a right to continue a given use of real property if such use is already in existence at the time of the enactment of a land use regulation forbidding or restricting the land use in question").
91. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1223-32 (2009).
92. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
93. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 415-17 (2000).
94. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (plurality opinion).
95. John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 485-93 (2010).
96. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 592-99 (1984).
97. Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just Compensation" Be Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 525-27 (2003).
98. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 527-32, 551-52, 602-06 (1986).
99. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). The Stop the Beach plurality cited Lingle only with approval. 130 S. Ct. at 2614-15 (plurality opinion).
100. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571-76 (1998).
101. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
102. Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549-57 (2001).
103. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1983).
104. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736-37 (1973).
105. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1676, 1706-09 (2010) (arguing that compensating owners at greater than fair market value would encourage corruption in the takings process).
106. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-21 (1990) [hereinafter Levmore, Just Compensation].
107. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-48 (1991).
108. Gregory F. Hauser, Representing Clients from Civil Law Legal Systems in U.S. Litigation: Understanding How Clients from Civil Law Nations View Civil Litigation and Helping Them Understand U.S. Lawsuits, 17 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 129, 131 (2004).
109. United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d. 938, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying an "objective standard of reasonable competence" for a claim for ineffective assistance).
110. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.").
111. Allen v. Secretary, 611 F.3d 740, 751 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that to prevail in federal court habeas proceedings, a challenge to a State's finding that counsel was not ineffective, a petitioner must show that the state court's conclusion was objectively unreasonable as a matter of law).
112. Doug Keller, Resolving a "Substantial Question": Just Who Is Entitled to Bail Pending Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 825, 826 (2008).
113. John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
114. Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 449-54 (2009) (discussing the costs associated with pro se litigation in the United States).
115. Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1547-49 (2005) (discussing the administrative burdens resulting from pro se litigation).
116. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008).
117. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So.3d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
118. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010) (plurality opinion).
119. Respondent Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Brief in Opposition, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2009) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 1206633.
120. 145 Giving the keynote address at a Chicago-Kent College of Law conference, "Judicial Takings: Property Rights and the Rule of Law" on October 18, 2011, Justice Scalia said of Stop the Beach, "We didn't take the case to decide Florida law, for Pete's sake.".
121. Scalia Criticizes Kelo Ruling on Private Property, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Elements/pages/print.aspx? printpath=/Articles/2011/10/19/17494&classname=tera.GN3Article.
122. Brief of Respondents, Florida Department of Environmental Protection & Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund at 18, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3143707.
123. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2008).
124. Terry Eastland, Supremely Screwed Up: A Do-Over for the High Court?, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2008, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/ Articles/000/000/015/365drohy.asp (discussing the Kennedy v. Louisiana mistake made by the Solicitor General's Office, which admitted its error in failing to file a brief when the Court considered that case).
125. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992).
126. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580-90 (1988).
127. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 652-53 (1999) (discussing the importance of stable judicial doctrine to robust property rights).
128. Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4423 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the rationale behind requiring an incentive to litigate for issue preclusion purposes).
129. Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 891-93 (Ind. 1997).
130. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319-34 (1985) (discussing the circumstances under which the Due Process Clause requires that claimants have meaningful access to high-quality legal representation).
131. John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463, 466 (2007) ("American courts have also routinely subscribed to the view that property law's fundamental goal is to provide stability and security in ownership and title.").
132. Bd. of Trs. v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1987).
133. Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 830-32 (1989).
134. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which had held that Pennsylvania legislation designed to prevent subsidence of surface land over coal deposits amounted to a regulatory taking by depriving the coal company of a support estate that it had purchased from the surface owners).
135. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
136. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
137. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001), .
138. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 564-65 (2005).
139. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
140. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
141. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847 n. 47 (2006).
142. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitutional Avoidance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1336-39 (2010).
143. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1623929.
144. Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601-02 (2010) (plurality opinion) (equating legislative and judicial takings to state takings through regulations).
145. Twigg v. Cnty. of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
146. Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 751-55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
147. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915).
148. Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).
149. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1701-02, 1711 (1988) (discussing the potential harm that an unpredictable takings law standard could cause to investors and government officials).
150. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922))).
151. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1039 (2003) ("The problem of eminent domain is essentially one of discriminatory taxation, which the government corrects through the provision of just compensation.").
152. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
153. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
154. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 303 (2002).
155. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532-37 (1998) (plurality opinion).
156. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).
157. David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice and Theory of Regulatory Takings, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 750 (1999).
158. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49 (1977).
159. Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 266 (1993).
160. Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 436-37 (1970).
161. Mannillo v. Gorski, 255 A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1969) (applying a new adverse possession "state of mind" requirement to the case before it because the parties were unlikely to have relied on the old rule).
162. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 162 (Wis. 1997) (applying a new rule permitting punitive damages without actual damages in part because of lack of defendant's reliance on the old rule).
163. Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 264-69 (2008).
164. Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 373 N.E.2d 255, 260-62 (N.Y. 1977).
165. Bloom v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 658 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1995).
166. Eastroads, L.L.C. v. Omaha Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 628 N.W.2d 677 (Neb. 2001).
167. Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 722 N.E.2d 1018 (Ohio 2000).
168. Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578 (R.I. 2001).
169. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2611 (2010) (plurality opinion).
170. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38 (1982).
171. Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (App. Div. 1987).
172. Julius L. Sackman, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.04[2] (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the case law regarding severance damages, which incorporates principles of in-kind compensation for special benefits to landowners).
173. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking Itself Is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975, 1977-80 (1998).
174. Sullivant v. City of Oklahoma City, 940 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1997) and advocating a rule whereby actual private benefits from a taking offset any just compensation that otherwise would be owed).
175. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 448-54 (2007) (identifying legislative planning as a reason for judicial deference in takings cases);.
176. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005) (finding that very extensive legislative findings and planning were necessary to justify the use of the eminent domain power for economic development purposes).