Does information increase political support for pension reform?

Public Choice

Volumn 150, Issue 1-2, 2012, Pages 327-362

  Boeri, Tito ^a   Tabellini, Guido ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

Information; Pension reform; Policy opinions

Indexed keywords

EID: 82755165204     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9706-6     Document Type: Article

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