Public employees as swing voters: Empirical evidence on opposition to public reform

Public Choice

Volumn 119, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 281-310

  Rattsø, Jørn ^a   Sørensen, Rune J ^b  

^a NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Norway)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142717430     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/b:puch.0000033325.81479.8b     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (28)

1. Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991). Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review 81: 1170-1188.
2. Bjørklund, T. (1999). Public versus private sector: A new division in voting behavior. In H.M. Narud and T. Aalberg (Eds.), Challenges to representative democracy: Parties, voters and public opinion. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
3. Bogen, H. and Langeland, O. (Eds.) (1989). Offentlig eller privat? FAFO report no. 078.
4. Boix, C. (1997). Privatizing the public business sector in the eighties: Economic performance, partisan responses and divided governments. British Journal of Political Science 27: 473-496.
5. Case, A. (2001). Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania. European Economic Review 45: 405-423.
6. Christoffersen, H. and Paldam, M. (2003). Markets and municipalities: A study of the behavior of the Danish municipalities. Public Choice 114: 79-102.
7. Coughlin, P., Mueller, D. and Murrell, P. (1990). Electoral politics, interest groups, and the size of government. Economic Inquiry 28: 682-705.
8. Dahlberg, M. and Johansson, E. (2002). On the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. American Political Science Review 96: 27-40.
9. Dixit, A. and Londregan, J. (1988). Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 497-529.
10. Domberger, S. and Jensen, P. (1997). Contracting out by the public sector: Theory, evidence, prospects. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13: 67-77.
11. Drazen, A. (2000). Political economy in macroeconomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
12. Dubin, J.A. and Navarro, P. (1988). How markets for impure public goods organize: The case of household refuse collection. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 4: 217-241.
13. Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presence of individual-specific uncertainty. American Economic Review 81: 1146-1155.
14. Hagen, T.P. and Sørensen, R.J. (1998). Fornyelse av kommunal organizering: Aktiv stat, reaktive kommuner? In K.K. Klausen and K. Stålberg (Eds.), New public management i Norden: Nye organisasjons- or ledelsesformer i den decentrale velfœrdsstat. Odense: Odense Universitetsforlaget.
15. Hettich, W. and Winer, S. (1988). Economic and political foundations of tax structure. American Economic Review 78: 701-712.
16. Holtz-Eakin, D. (1992). Elections and aggregation: Interpreting econometric analyses of local governments. Public Choice 74: 17-42.
17. Johansson, E. (2002). Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: Some empirical evidence from Swedish municipalities. Journal of Public Economics (forthcoming).
18. Kontopoulos, Y. and Perotti, R. (1999). Government fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from OECD countries. In J. Poterba and J. von Hagen (Eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
19. Lindbeck, A. and Weibull, J. (1993). A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy. Journal of Public Economics 51: 195-209.
20. Listhaug, O. (1997). The decline of class voting. In K. Strøm and L. Svåsand (Eds.), Challenges to political parties: The case of Norway. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
21. Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997). Privatisation in the United States. Rand Journal of Economics 28: 447-471.
22. Lupia, A. (1992). Busy voters, agenda control, and the power of information. American Political Science Review 869: 390-403.
23. Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1998). Political economics and public finance. In Handbook of Public Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. Forthcoming.
24. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1994). Politicians and firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 995-1025.
25. Sørensen, R.J. og Bay, A.-H. (2002). Competitive tendering in the welfare state: Perceptions and preferences among local politicians. Scandinavian Political Studies 25: 357-384.
26. Stømberg, D. (1998). Radios impact on New Deal spending. Working Paper, IIES, University of Stockholm, Sweden.
27. Wise, L.R. and Szücz (1996). The public/private cleavage in a welfare state: Attitudes toward public management reform. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 9: 43-70.
28. Wright, G. (1974). The political economy of New Deal spending: An econometric analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics 56: 30-38.