Why people want something for nothing: The role of asymmetrical illusions

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 109-143

  Winter, Søren ^b   Mouritzen, Poul Erik ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035585222     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1007185029456     Document Type: Article

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