Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 157, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 177-194

  Robinson, Michael ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Alternative possibilities; Flickers of freedom; Frankfurt; Frankfurt type counterexamples; Moral responsibility; PAP; Robust

Indexed keywords

EID: 82655189324     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9631-z     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Fischer, J. M. (1986). Responsibility and control. In J. M. Fischer (Ed.), Moral responsibility (pp. 174-190). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2. Fischer, J. M. (1994). The metaphysics of free will. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
3. Fischer, J. M. (1999). Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics, 110, 93-139.
4. Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829-839.
5. Ginet, C. (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why i don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 403-417 (Reprinted with an added addendum in Widerker and McKenna, Eds., 2003, pp. 75-90).
6. Haji, I. (1998). Moral appraisability. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Haji, I., & McKenna, M. (2004). Dialectical delicacies in the debate about freedom and alternative possibilities. Journal of Philosophy, 101, 299-314.
8. Hunt, D. P. (2000). Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies, 97, 195-227.
9. Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
10. Locke, J. (1690/1965). An essay concerning human understanding (abridged and Ed. M. Cranston). New York: Collier.
11. McKenna, M. (2003). Robustness, control, and the demand for morally significant alternatives: Frankfurt examples with oodles and oodles of alternatives. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities (pp. 201-218). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
12. Mele, A. R., & Robb, D. (1998). Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases. The Philosophical Review, 107, 97-112.
13. Mele, A. R., & Robb, D. (2003). Bbs, magnets and seesaws: The metaphysics of Frankfurt-style cases. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities (pp. 127-138). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
14. Naylor, M. (1984). Frankfurt on the principle of alternate possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 46, 249-258.
15. Pereboom, D. (2000). Alternative possibilities and causal histories. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 119-138.
16. Shabo, S. (2007). Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe. Philosophia, 35, 63-74.
17. Stump, E. (1996). Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities. In D. Howard-Snyder & J. Jordan (Eds.), Faith, freedom and rationality (pp. 73-88). Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
18. Timpe, K. (2006). A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism. Philosophia, 34, 189-202.
19. van Inwagen, Peter. (1978). Ability and moral responsibility. Philosophical Review, 87, 201-224 (Reprinted in Moral Responsibility by J. M. Fischer, Ed., 1986, Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
20. Widerker, D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review, 104, 247-261.