A critique of frankfurt-libertarianism

Philosophia

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 189-202

  Timpe, Kevin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Alternative possibilities; Eleonore stump; Flicker of freedom; Frankfurt style couterexamples; Incompatibilism; Libertarianism; Principle of alternative possibilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845349269     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-006-9012-1     Document Type: Article

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