Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to timpe

Philosophia

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 63-74

  Shabo, Seth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

Author keywords

Causal determinism; Compatibilism; Eleonore stump; Flickers of freedom; Frankfurt style cases; Kevin timpe; Moral responsibility; Principle of alternative possibilities; Source incompatibilism

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249874874     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-007-9050-3     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Clarke, R. (1996). Agent-causation and event-causation in the production of free will. Philosophical Topics, 24, 19-48.
2. Della Rocca, M. (1998). Frankfurt, Fischer, and flickers. Nous, 32, 99-105.
3. Fischer, J. (1982). Responsibility and control. Journal of Philosophy, 79, 24-40.
4. Fischer, J. (1994). The metaphysics of free will. Cambridge: Blackwell.
5. Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829-839.
6. Ginet, C. (1996). In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 403-417.
7. Hunt, D. (2000). Moral responsibility and unavoidable action. Philosophical Studies, 97, 195-227.
8. Hunt, D. (2005). Moral responsibility and buffered alternatives. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29, 126-145.
9. Kane, R. (1985). Free will and values. Albany: State University of New York.
10. Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Mackie, D. (2000). Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility. In T. Van den Beld (Ed.) Moral responsibility and ontology (pp. 103-112). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
12. Naylor, M. (1984). Frankfurt on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 46, 249-258.
13. Pereboom, D. (1995). Determinism al dente. Nous, 29, 21-45.
14. Pereboom, D. (2000). Alternate possibilities and causal histories. Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 119-138.
15. Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Stump, E. (1996). Libertarian freedom and the principle of alternative possibilities. In D. Howard-Snyder & J. Jordan (Eds.), Faith, freedom and rationality (pp. 73-88). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
17. Stump, E. (1999a). Alternative possibilities and moral responsibility: The flicker of freedom. Journal of Ethics, 3, 299-324.
18. Stump, E. (1999b). Dust, determinism, and Frankfurt: A reply to Goetz. Faith and Philosophy, 16, 413-422.
19. Timpe, K. (2006). A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism. Philosophia, 34, 189-202.
20. Widerker, D. (1995a). Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review, 104, 247-261.
21. Widerker, D. (1995b). Libertarian freedom and the avoidability of decisions. Faith and Philosophy, 12, 113-118.
22. Zagzebski, L. (2000). Does libertarian freedom require alternative possibilities? Philosophical Perspectives, 14, 231-248.