Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The metaphysics of Frankfurt-style cases

Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities

Volumn , Issue , 2017, Pages 127-138

  Mele, Alfred R ^a   Robb, David ^b  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DAVIDSON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85070994109     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (24)

1. Ehring, Douglas (1997), Causation and Persistence, New York: Oxford University Press
2. Ekstrom, Laura (2002), 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases' in Robert Kane (ed.), The Free Will Handbook, New York: Oxford University Press
3. Fischer, John Martin (ed.) (1986), Moral Responsibility, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
4. Fischer, John Martin (1994), The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell
5. Fischer, John Martin (1999), 'Recent Work on Moral Responsibility' Ethics 110, pp. 93-139
6. Frankfurt, Harry (1969), 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' Journal of Philosophy 66, pp. 828-39. Reprinted in Fischer (1986)
7. Ginet, Carl (1996), 'In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing' Philosophical Perspectives 10, pp. 403-17. Reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4
8. Ginet, Carl (forthcoming), 'Libertarianism' in Dean Zimmerman and Michael Loux (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press
9. Hunt, David P. (2000), 'Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action' Philosophical Studies 97, pp. 195-228
10. Kane, Robert (1985), Free Will and Values, New York: SUNY Press
11. Kane, Robert (1996), The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press
12. Kane, Robert (2000), 'Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, pp. 157-67
13. Kane, Robert (n.d.), 'Responsibility and Frankfurt-Style Cases: A Response to Mele and Robb'
14. Mele, Alfred R. (1996), 'Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Scenarios' Philosophical Topics 24, pp. 123-41
15. Mele, Alfred R. (2000), 'Deciding to Act' Philosophical Studies 100, pp. 81-108
16. Mele, Alfred R. and David Robb (1998), 'Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases' Philosophical Review 107, pp. 97-112
17. O'Connor, Timothy (2000), Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press
18. Pereboom, Derk (2001), Living Without Free Will, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
19. Schaffer, Jonathan (2000), 'Trumping Preemption' The Journal of Philosophy 97, pp. 165-81
20. Vihvelin, Kadri (1995), 'Causes, Effects, and Counterfactual Dependence' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, pp. 560-73
21. Widerker, David (1995a), 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities' Philosophical Review 104, pp. 247-61
22. Widerker, David (1995b), 'Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions' Faith and Philosophy 12, pp. 113-18
23. Widerker, David (2000), 'Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look' Philosophical Perspectives 14, pp. 181-201
24. Wyma, Keith (1997), 'Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action' American Philosophical Quarterly 34, pp. 57-70