Self-Knowledge

Self-Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-304

  Hatzimoysis, Anthony ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

Author keywords

Belief formation; Deliberation; Epistemic status; Epistemic warrant; Introspection; Oneself; Rationality; Reflection; Self knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 81855218333     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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