The Subject's Point of View

The Subject's Point of View

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-232

  Farkas, Katalin ^a  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Cartesian; Externalism; Externalist; Internalism; Internalist; Mind; Phenomenal properties; Privileged access; Self knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 75949129619     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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