Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Our Knowledge of the Internal World

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-160

  Stalnaker, Robert C ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquaintance; Anti individualism; Contextualism; Foundationalism; Phenomenal character; Possible worlds; Propositional content

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922014638     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545995.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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