Do bad risks know it? Experimental evidence on optimism and adverse selection

Economics Letters

Volumn 114, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 168-171

  Coelho, Marta ^a   de Meza, David ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Forecast error; Insurance; Optimism; Selection effects

Indexed keywords

EID: 80855132398     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.012     Document Type: Article

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