Thinking styles and risky decision-making: Further exploration of the affect-probability weighting link

Journal of Behavioral Decision Making

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 443-455

  Mukherjee, Kanchan ^a  

^a INSEAD   (Singapore)

Author keywords

Affect; Anticipatory emotions; Dual process systems; Hope and fear; Probability weighting

Indexed keywords

EID: 80455123712     PISSN: 08943257     EISSN: 10990771     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.700     Document Type: Article

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