Heat expands all things: The proliferation of greenhouse gas regulation under the obama administration

Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 421-452

  Adler, Jonathan H ^a  

^a CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 80155178892     PISSN: 01934872     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (116)

1. See The Office of the President-Elect, Agenda: Energy & Environment, CHANGE. GOV, http://change.gov/agenda/energy-and-environment-agenda/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2011);
2. see also Barack Obama, U. S. Sen., Remarks at Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Real Leadership for a Clean Energy Future (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www. barackobama.com/2007/10/08/remarks-of-senator-barack-obam-28.php.
3. See John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html.
4. The American Clean Energy and Security Act sought to reduce GHG emissions by 3% below 2005 levels by 2012, 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, and 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. H. R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). It is unlikely that this level of reductions would have been achieved.
5. See Darrell Samuelsohn & Coral Davenport, Democrats Pull Plug on Climate Bill, POLITICO (July 22, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/ stories/0710/40109.html.
6. See U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, U. S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010, at 39 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/car5/index.htm ("Since assuming office, President Obama has moved quickly to establish new federal policies and measures designed to reassert American leadership in solving the global climate challenge.").
7. 549 U. S. 497 (2007).
8. See William Collins et al., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI. AM., Aug. 2007, at 68 (noting that the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report concluded that it was "very likely" that human activity was responsible for most of late twentieth century warming, whereas the 2001 IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only "likely");
9. see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 665 (2007) ("Greenhouse gas forcing has very likely caused most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years.");
10. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2010) ("Climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for-and in many cases is already affecting-a broad range of human and natural systems.").
11. This uncertainty need not preclude action to mitigate the threat of climate change. The case for taking action to address rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases need not be premised upon apocalyptic climate projections. See, e.g., ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE CLIMATE FIX: WHAT SCIENTISTS AND POLITICIANS WON'T TELL YOU ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 128-29 (2010);
12. Jonathan H. Adler, Taking Property Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, 26 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 296, 307-09 (2009).
13. See PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., CLIMATE OF EXTREMES: GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE THEY DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 11-20 (2009);
14. see also PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE SATANIC GASES: CLEARING THE AIR ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING (2000);
15. ROY W. SPENCER, CLIMATE CONFUSION: HOW GLOBAL WARMING HYSTERIA LEADS TO BAD SCIENCE, PANDERING POLITICIANS AND MISGUIDED POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR 6 (2008);
16. John R. Christy, The Global Warming Fiasco, in GLOBAL WARMING AND OTHER ECO-MYTHS: HOW THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE SCIENCE TO SCARE US TO DEATH (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002).
17. 2O), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Id. at 52, 923.
18. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Gen. Counsel, EPA, to Carol M. Browner, Adm'r, EPA 2 (Apr. 10, 1998), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/ 2007/05/21/cannon-memorandum.pdf.
19. The EPA requested public comment on the petition in January 2001, see Control of Emissions from New and In-use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66 Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001), but it did not respond to the petition until September 2003. See Control of Emissions, supra note 12.
20. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 505 nn. 2-4 (2007). Various businesses supported the state and environmentalist petitioners, including the Aspen Skiing Corporation, Calpine, and Entergy, as did some trade associations and groups representing renewable energy interests.
21. See generally Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 208 (2002) (discussing business support for GHG emission control policies).
22. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53, 58 (D. C. Cir. 2005).
23. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 528, 534-35 (2007).
24. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U. S. at 526.
25. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40 ENVTL. L. 1261, 1323 (2010) ("The CAA is not a tool designed to deal with GHG emissions, or more specifically CO2.");
26. see also Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2008);
27. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).
28. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U. S. at 533 ("[T]he use of the word 'judgment' is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits.").
29. See 42 U. S. C. § 7521 (a) (1) (2006).
30. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U. S. at 533 ("Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do."). Under the Court's holding, it is possible that the EPA could have tried to withhold its judgment, perhaps by explaining that it was not going to make or reject an endangerment finding at this time because it was devoting resources to other concerns. Yet this would have been a difficult position for the Agency to maintain because of repeated public pronouncements about the threat of climate change-pronouncements that all but endorsed an actual endangerment finding.
31. See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, EPA, to Sen. Jay Rockefeller (Feb. 22, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/lpj-letter.pdf ("As a result of the Court's decision, EPA became obligated to treat greenhouse-gas emissions as air pollution under the Clean Air Act and to engage with the best available science in determining whether those emissions endanger Americans' health or welfare.").
32. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202 (a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66, 496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (final rule).
33. 42 U. S. C. § 7602 (h) (2006) ("All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or combination with other air pollutants.").
34. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25, 324 (May 7, 2010).
35. For a discussion of the potential safety consequences of automotive fuel economy regulations, see Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J. L. & ECON. 97 (1989).
36. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium-and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74, 152 (Nov. 30, 2010). The regulation covers on-road vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 8, 500 pounds or more, excluding trailers. Id. at 74, 153.
37. 42 U. S. C. § 7411 (b) (1) (A) (2006) (requiring the Agency to set emission performance standards for stationary sources that "cause[] or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare").
38. See 40 C. F. R. §§ 60. 40a-.46 (2009) (standards of performance for fossil-fuel fired steam generators for which construction is commenced after August 17, 1971).
39. See 42 U. S. C. § 7411 (a) (1), (f) (1) (2006) (defining "standard of performance" as "a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated").
40. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54, 970, 54, 996-97 (Sept. 9, 2010) (discussing consideration of performance standards for GHGs).
41. See 42 U. S. C. § 7411 (d) (2006).
42. See EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information, EPA. GOV, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
43. See 42 U. S. C. § 7475 (2006).
44. 42 U. S. C. § 7661 (2) (2006) adopts the definition provided in id. § 7602 (j), defining a "major" source as "any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant." For regulation of hazardous air pollutants, id. § 7661 (2) incorporates the even more stringent definition contained in id. § 7412 (2006).
45. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55, 292, 55, 294 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter GHG Tailoring Rule] (proposed rule).
46. See U. S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A REGULATORY BURDEN: THE COMPLIANCE DIMENSION OF REGULATING CO2 AS A POLLUTANT 3 (2008), available at http://www.uschamber.com/co2.
47. Id. at 11. See also Reitze, Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 28, at 1302 (summarizing industry estimates of the number of facilities subject to PSD for greenhouse gas emissions).
48. Press Release, EPA, New EPA Rule Will Require Use of Best Technologies to Reduce Greenhouse Gases from Large Facilities/Small Businesses and Farms Exempt (Sept. 30, 2009).
49. See 549 U. S. 497, 533-34 (2007).
50. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31, 514 (June 3, 2010) (final rule).
51. See Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1245-46 (2010).
52. see Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1532-63.
53. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 87 (2007) (summarizing the "cooperative federalism" approach to environmental regulation).
54. Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Rules on Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Aug. 12, 2010).
55. 42 U. S. C. § 7408 (a) (1) (2006).
56. 545 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. 42 U. S. C. § 7409 (2006).
58. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).
59. 549 U. S. 497, 530 (2007).
60. 42 U. S. C. § 7509.
61. Jonathan Wiener, Climate Policy After Mass v. EPA, THE FACULTY BLOG (Apr. 3, 2007, 2:24 PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/climate- policy-.html.
62. Petition from the Center for Biological Diversity to Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, Environmental Protection Agency, Petition To Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009).
63. See Margaret Kriz Hobson, A Change of Weather, NAT'L J., Dec. 19, 2009, at 36 (reporting on the Obama Administration's "government-wide strategy of acknowledging and attempting to curb global warming").
64. See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (West 2010).
65. The regulation also requires firm-wide reporting in certain industries, including vehicle and engine manufacturers and some fossil fuel suppliers. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56, 260 (Oct. 30, 2009).
66. See H. R. 2764, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2007).
67. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56, 260, 56, 264 (Oct. 30, 2009).
68. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now What?, 1 WASH & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T 9 (2010).
69. See Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Asst. Adm'r, EPA, to Ms. Miyoko Sakashita, Ctr. for Biological Diversity (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www. biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ocean-acidification/pdfs/EPA-Response-to-CBD- Ocean-Acidification-Petition.pdf.
70. Memorandum from Denise Keehner, Director, Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds, EPA, to the Water Division Directors, Regions 1-10, Integrated Reporting and Listing Decisions Related to Ocean Acidification (Nov. 15, 2010).
71. See Letter from Cal. Air. Res. Bd. to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA (Dec. 21, 2005).
72. See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor, Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj. pdf.
73. For a discussion of the legal and policy issues surrounding California's waiver request, see generally Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008).
74. See John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1.
75. Press Release, EPA, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver (June 30, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/ 5e448236de5fb369852575e500568e1b! OpenDocument. For a fuller discussion of the legal and policy issues raised by California's request for a waiver of preemption, see Adler, supra note 114, at 453-62.
76. See generally U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 5, at 39-75.
77. Exec. Order No. 13, 514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52, 117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
78. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to the Sec'y of Energy, Appliance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/ApplianceEfficiencyStandards/.
79. 75 Fed. Reg. 8, 046 (Feb. 23, 2010).
80. See Juliet Eilperin, Interior Launches Climate Strategy, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2009, at A3 ("Interior manages one-fifth of the nation's land mass and nearly 1.7 billion acres on the Outer Continental Shelf.").
81. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service Announces Final Designation of Polar Bear Critical Habitat (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Fish-and-Wildlife-Service-Announces- Final-Designation-of-Polar-Bear-Critical-Habitat.cfm.
82. 16 U. S. C. § 1536 (a) (2) (2006).
83. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61, 649, 75 Fed. Reg. 6, 290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
84. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25, 324, 25, 328 (May 7, 2010).
85. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT: STRUCTURE, EFFECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF A KNOWABLE PATHWAY 36 (2010), available at www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-23.pdf.
86. See Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10480, 10482 tbl. II (2010).
87. See E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA Amendments, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (2010).
88. See Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise in Unreality, AEI ENERGY & ENV'T OUTLOOK 2, July 2009, at 2.
89. See id.; Jesse Jenkins, Analysis of Waxman-Markey ACES Climate Bill: Full Breakthrough Institute Collection, BREAKTHROUGH BLOG (June 26, 2009, 12:15 AM), http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/06/aces-analysis-full-breakthroug.shtml. In most existing cap-and-trade programs credits "are heavily over-allocated and allow excessive banking of credits, undermining their effectiveness in achieving meaningful emission reductions."
90. Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Appraoch Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1137-38 (2010);
91. see also Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009).
92. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008, at 48 (2008) (showing atmospheric GHG concentrations would still rise above 450ppm by mid-century even if OECD member nation emissions are excluded).
93. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U. N. T. S. 107.
94. See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Current Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004) ("Proposals to limit atmospheric CO2 to a concentration that would prevent most damaging climate change have focused on a goal of 500+/-50 parts per million (ppm), or less than double the preindustrial concentration of 280 ppm."). Some environmentalist organizations advocate a significantly lower target of 350 ppm, which would require even more ambitious measures.
95. See Andrew C. Revkin, Campaign Against Emissions Picks Number, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at A8. See generally 350. ORG, http://www.350.org.
96. See, e.g., John Alic et al., Opinion, A New Strategy for Energy Innovation, 466 NATURE 316, 316 (2010) ("Limiting the concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in Earth's atmosphere requires a technological and economic revolution. ");
97. Scott Barrett, The Coming Global Climate-Technology Revolution, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53 (2009) (arguing that "stabilizing concentrations will require a technological revolution-a 'revolution' because it will require fundamental change, achieved within a relatively short period of time");
98. Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCI. 981, 981 (2002) ("Arguably, the most effective way to reduce CO2 emissions with economic growth and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy production, distribution, storage, and conversion. "). The challenge could be even greater than generally assumed, as it is possible that conventional estimates already incorporate unrealistic assumptions about the rate of emission-reducing technological change in business-as-usual scenarios.
99. See Roger Pielke Jr., Tom Wigley & Christopher Green, Dangerous Assumptions, 452 NATURE 531, 531 (2008).
100. 2 Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure, 6329 SCI. 1330, 1330 (2010).
101. 2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: HIGHLIGHTS 44 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/ CO2highlights.pdf.
102. See Access to Electricity, IEA. ORG, http://www.iea.org/weo/electricity. asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
103. According to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "[d]eveloping countries cannot and will not compromise on development." See L. Barber, Transcript: Wen Jiabao, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790-0000779fd2ac.html ("[I]t's difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction quotas at the Copenhagen conference, because this country is still at an early stage of development.");
104. Ravi Nessman, India: Climate Deal Can't Sacrifice Poor Nations, GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian. co.uk/world/feedarticle/8767757;
105. see also Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 557, 564 (2009) (arguing that "there is no simple way to get major developing countries, such as India and China, to participate in an agreement").
106. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1676-77 (2008).
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
109. See Jason Scott Johnson, A Looming Policy Disaster, REG., Fall 2008, at 40 ("[R]eally large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions depend upon the widespread adoption of new technologies that are either not yet technologically and economically feasible-most prominently carbon capture and sequestration-or whose large-scale implementation possibilities are seemingly inherently limited and are at best unclear....").
110. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING THE FUTURE MAGNITUDE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at ix (2010).
111. See Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (2011).
112. See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, in BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL FUTURE 175-76 (Alyson C. Flournoy & David M. Driesen eds., 2010).
113. Lee Lane, The Green Movement and the Challenge of Climate Change, AEI ENERGY AND ENV'T OUTLOOK, Feb. 2009, at 3;
114. Anne E. Smith, Jeremy Platt & A. Denny Ellerman, The Costs of Reducing Utility SO2 Emissions-Not as Low as You Might Think (Ctr. for Energy and Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 98010, 1998).
115. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3 (2009);
116. Michael J. Waggoner, The House Erred: A Carbon Tax Is Better than Cap and Trade, TAX NOTES, Sept. 21, 2009.