An environmental competition statute

Beyond Environmental Law: Policy Proposals for a Better Environmental Future

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 173-198

  Driesen, David M ^a  

^a SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84925643363     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511802591.009     Document Type: Chapter

References (36)

1. David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law 98– 102 (2003)
2. Miguel Mendonca, Feed-in Tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of Renewable NuclearEnergy 43 (2007)
3. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992).
4. DavidM. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 14–16 (2005)
5. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 771, 805–31 (1977)
6. Note, Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 Yale L.J. 1713, 1718–19 (1979)
7. Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1243 (1999).
8. Michael Grubb et al., Allowance Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme: A Commentary, 5 Climate Pol’y 127, 127 (2005)
9. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Beyond the Economic Incentive/Command and Control Dichotomy, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 289-324 (1998);
10. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
11. A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air: the U.S. Acid Rain Program 130 (2000).
12. David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation? 33 Envt’l L. Rep. 10,094, 10,105 (2003);
13. Byron Swift, Command without Control: Why Capand- Trade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 Envt’l L. Rep. 10,330, 10,332 (2001)
14. Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin & David A. Hounshell, Regulation as the Mother of Invention: The Case of SO2 Control, 27 Law & Pol’y 348-370 (2005)
15. David Popp, Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. Pol’y Anal. & Mgmt. 641 (2003)
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17. Andrew McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia, and Inconsistency, 45 Emory L.J. 1329, 1359 (1996)
18. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and an Analysis of the European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 Nat. Resources J. 865, 902–03 (2005)
19. Axel Michaelowa&Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis, 5 Climate Pol’y 1, 5 (2005)
20. Grubb G et al., supra note 11, at 132–33 (same);
21. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 861 (D.C. Cir. Tom Tietenberg, Using Economic Incentives to Maintain our Environment), 33 Challenge 42-43 (1990).
22. David M. Driesen, The Changing Climate for United States Law, 1 Climate Change L. Rev. 33-38 (2007)
23. Nathaniel Greene & Venessa Ward, Getting the Sticker Price Right: Incentives for Cleaner, More Efficient Vehicles, 12 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 289-346 (1998).
24. Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation and Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 Temple J. Envtl. L. & Tech. 51-56 (2006)
25. New Progressive Agenda for Public Health and the Environment: A Project of the Center for Progressive Regulation 57–70
26. James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global Warming Constitutes “Dangerous” Anthropogenic Interference, 68 ClimateChange 269-277 (2005)
27. Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2.C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi- Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change 269-70
28. Klaus Lindegaard, Environmental Law, Environmental Globalization, and Sustainable Techno-Economic Evolution, in Environment, Technology, and EconomicGrowth 141 (Andrew Tylecote&Jan van Der Straaten eds. 1998)
29. David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 65 (2009).
30. Ozone Depleting Chloroflurocarbons, Proposed Production Restriction, 45 Fed. Reg. 66, 732–33 (1980)
31. George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 618–19 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
32. Healy V. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to discriminatory measures).
33. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1987) (invalidating an Ohio tax credit given only to local ethanol producers despite a claim that the credit helped protect the environment).
34. E. Enters. V. Apfel, 539–58 (1998) (concurring and dissenting opinions).
35. Collins V. City of Marker Heights, 503 U.S. 115-125 (1992) (unanimous opinion)
36. Compare Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. V. Connolly, 211 (1986) (upholding requirement that private companies fund retirees’ pensions after terminating a retirement plan);