The invisible hand of democracy: Political control and the provision of public services

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 587-621

  Lake, David A ^a   Baum, Matthew A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035597618     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414001034006001     Document Type: Article

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