Innovation in multi-invention contexts: Mapping solutions to technological and intellectual property complexity

California Management Review

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 47-79

  Somaya, Deepak ^a   Teece, David ^a   Wakeman, Simon ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054081429     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/cmr.2011.53.4.47     Document Type: Article

References (63)

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5. "Multi-invention context" is a broad term that includes the more commonly cited "systemic innovation" and "complex systems" contexts. However, multi-invention contexts are not limited to industries in which inventions are assembled into systems products. For a discussion of systemic innovation, see D. J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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10. R. P. Merges, "Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations", California Law Review, 84/5(1996):1293-1393]. Patent pools may have worked well in the past because there was a smaller set of firms contributing to the technology and ownership over (and the ability to profit from) knowledge and they were not as contentious. However, in modern multi-invention contexts patent pools are largely restricted to patents essential for implementing technology standards (in part due to the antitrust treatment of pooling arrangements).
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59. In the electronics and semiconductor industries, where overlapping developments and mutually blocking patents are inevitable, enterprises regularly cross-license patents with each other to ensure that they have the freedom to innovate and manufacture without inadvertent infringement. In patent cross licenses, technology is not usually transferred, as the parties are generally capable of (and often already are) using the technology in question without assistance. A license in this instance simply confers the right to use the intellectual property without being sued for infringement. P. C. Grindley and D. J. Teece, "Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics", California Management Review, 39/2(Winter 1997):8-41.
60. See also "Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: Suits, Settlements and the Explosion of Patent Litigation", Jean Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman, unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics, June 2002;
61. D. Somaya, "Patent Strategy Viewed through the Lens of Patent Litigation", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, 2002.
62. B. H. Hall and R. H. Ziedonis, "The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U. S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995", RAND Journal of Economics, 32/1(Spring 2001):101-128.
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