Multiple aspects in the sense of agency1

New Ideas in Psychology

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 15-31

  Gallagher, Shaun ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

F intention; Intentional aspect; Motor control; P intention; Phenomenology; Sense of agency

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053622723     PISSN: 0732118X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.003     Document Type: Article

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