Solving cooperative reliability games

Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2011

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 27-34

  Bachrach, Yoram ^a   Meir, Reshef ^b   Feldman, Michal ^c   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United Kingdom)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GAME THEORY; PROBABILITY;

COOPERATIVE GAME; EMPTY CORE; JOINT ACTIONS; SHAPLEY VALUE; SOLUTION CONCEPTS;

RELIABILITY;

EID: 80053157815     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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