On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 595-613

  Timmer, Judith ^a,b   Borm, Peter ^a   Tijs, Stef ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperative games; Random variables; Shapley value

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344561749     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400181     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. O'Neill B (1982) A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud, Mathematical Social Sciences 2:345-371
4. Shapley L (1953) A Value for n-Person Games, In: Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Kuhn HW. Tucker AW (eds.), Annals of Mathematics Studies, vol. 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey pp. 307-312
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6. Timmer J, Borm P, Tijs S (2000) Convexity in Stochastic Cooperative Situations, Center Discussion Paper no. 2000-04, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. To appear in International Game Theory Review
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