Management of hazardous waste and contaminated land

Annual Review of Resource Economics

Volumn 3, Issue , 2011, Pages 255-275

  Sigman, Hilary ^a,b,c   Stafford, Sarah ^d  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^d The College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

Environmental protection; Liability; Pollution; Superfund

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052977755     PISSN: 19411340     EISSN: 19411359     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-resource-083110-120011     Document Type: Review

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