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Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 27-41

Assessing the Effectiveness of State Regulation and Enforcement of Hazardous Waste

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EID: 0037234772     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021827329582     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (35)

References (30)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.