The two-part instrument in a second-best world

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 9-10, 2005, Pages 1961-1975

  Fullerton, Don ^a   Wolverton, Ann ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b U S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deposit refund system; Tax subsidy; Two part instrument

Indexed keywords

EID: 23244457606     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.011     Document Type: Article

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