Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions: Comments on Keith DeRose's "Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys"

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 156, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 111-120

  Rysiew, Patrick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052930552     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9804-4     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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