States as Ecologies of Political Enterprises

Review of Political Economy

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 573-585

  Eusepi, Giuseppe ^a   Wagner, Richard E ^b  

^a SAPIENZA UNIVERSITY OF ROME   (Italy)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858812543     PISSN: 09538259     EISSN: 14653982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09538259.2011.611623     Document Type: Article

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