Are politicians office or policy motivated? The case of U.S. governors' environmental policies

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 241-253

  Fredriksson, Per G ^a   Wang, Le ^b   Mamun, Khawaja A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE   (United States)

^c SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Candidate motivation; Elections; Environmental spending; Political economy; Regression discontinuity; States; Term limits

Indexed keywords

CANDIDATE MOTIVATION; ELECTIONS; ENVIRONMENTAL SPENDING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY; STATES; TERM LIMITS;

ECONOMICS; GOVERNORS;

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; PREFERENCE BEHAVIOR; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 80051935038     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.005     Document Type: Article

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