An institutional mechanism for assortment in an ecology of games

PLoS ONE

Volumn 6, Issue 8, 2011, Pages

  Smaldino, Paul E ^a   Lubell, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; ECOLOGY OF GAME MODEL; GAME; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PROCESS DEVELOPMENT; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK; SOCIAL PARTICIPATION; SOCIAL STRUCTURE; SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY; ECOLOGY; THEORETICAL MODEL;

ECOLOGY; GAME THEORY; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 79961158100     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0023019     Document Type: Article

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