The leader rule: A model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 113-136

  Laslier, Jean François ^a  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Condorcet; Rationality; Sincerity; Strategic

Indexed keywords

EID: 58149490702     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097286     Document Type: Article

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