Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma with Intragroup Power Dynamics

Games

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 21-51

  Juvina, Ion ^a   Lebiere, Christian ^a   Martin, Jolie M ^a   Gonzalez, Cleotilde ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive modeling; Intergroup prisoner's dilemma; Intragroup power; Repeated prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960104921     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20734336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3390/g2010021     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Erev, I.; Roth, A.E. Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria. Am. Econ. Rev. 1998, 88, 848-881.
2. Lebiere, C.; Wallach, D.; West, R.L. A Memory-Based Account of the Prisoner's Dilemma and Other 2 × 2 Games; In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Cognitive Modeling, Groningen, Netherlands, March 2000; pp. 185-193.
3. Rapoport, A.; Guyer, M.J.; Gordon, D.G. The 2 × 2 Game; The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 1976.
4. Anderson, J.R.; Lebiere, C. The Atomic Components of Thought; Erlbaum: Mahwah, NJ, USA, 1998.
5. Rapoport, A. Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution; D. Reidel Publishing Company: Boston, MA, USA, 1974.
6. Camerer, C.F. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2003.
7. Putnam, R.D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. Int. Organ. 1988, 42, 427-460.
8. Bornstein, G. The free rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1992, 62, 597-606.
9. Bornstein, G. Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 2003, 7, 129-145.
10. Halevy, N.; Bornstein, G.; Sagiv, L. "In-group love" and "out-group hate" as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict. Psychol. Sci. 2008, 19, 405-411.
11. Emerson, R.M. Power-dependence relations. Am. Sociol. Rev. 1962, 27, 31-41.
12. Levin, S.; Sidanius, J.; Rabinowitz, J.L.; Federico, C. Ethnic Identity, Legitimizing ideologies, and social status: A matter of ideological asymmetry. Polit. Psychol. 1998, 19, 373-404.
13. Morrison, K.R.; Fast, N.J.; Ybarra, O. Group status, perceptions of threat, and support for social inequality. J. Exp. Soi. Psychol. 2009, 45, 204-210.
14. Morrison, K.R.; Ybarra, O. The effects of realistic threat and group identification on social dominance orientation. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2008, 44, 156-163.
15. Jost, J.T.; Banaji, M.R.; Nosek, B.A. A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo. Polit. Psychol. 2004, 25, 881-919.
16. Rabinowitz, J.L. Go with the flow or fight the power? The interactive effects of social dominance orientation and perceived injustice on support for the status quo. Polit. Psychol. 1999, 20, 1-24.
17. Langner, C.A.; Keltner, D. Social power and emotional experience: Actor and partner effects within dyadic interactions. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 2008, 44, 848-856.
18. Dowding, K. Power (Concepts in Social Thought); University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, USA, 1996.
19. Simon, H.A. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychol. Rev. 1956, 63, 129-138.
20. Rapoport, A.; Chammah, A.M. Prisoner's Dilemma; University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 1965.
21. Erev, I.; Ert, E.; Roth, A.E. A choice prediction competition for market entry games: An introduction. Games 2010, 1, 117-136.
22. Gonzalez, C.; Lerch, J.F.; Lebiere, C. Instance-based learning in dynamic decision making. Cogn. Sci. 2003, 27, 591-635.
23. West, R.L.; Lebiere, C. Simple games as dynamic, coupled systems: Randomness and other emergent properties. Cogn. Syst. Res. 2001, 1, 221-239.
24. Baker, F.; Rachlin, H. Teaching and learning in a probabilistic Prisoner's Dilemma. Behav. Process. 2002, 57, 211-226.
25. Alexrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation; Basic Books: New York, NY, USA, 1984.
26. Nowak, M.; Sigmund, K. A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift that Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Nature 1993, 364, 56-58.
27. Anderson, J.R. How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe? Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2007.
28. Lebiere, C.; West, R.L. A dynamic ACT-R model of simple games. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada, 1999; Available online at: http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/papers/240/SDOC2298.pdf (accessed on 6 February 2011).
29. Wildschut, T.; Pinter, B.; Vevea, J.L.; Insko, C.A.; Schopler, J. Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. Psychol. Bull. 2003, 129, 698-722.
30. Rilling, J.K.; Goldsmith, D.R.; Glenn, A.L.; Jairam, M.R.; Elfenbein, H.A.; Dagenais, J.E.; et al. The neural correlates of the affective response to unreciprocated cooperation. Neuropsychologia 2008, 46, 1256-1266.
31. West, R.L.; Stewart, T.; Lebiere, C.; Chandrasekharan, S. Stochastic resonance in human cognition: ACT-R versus game theory, associative neural networks, recursive neural networks, q-learning, and humans. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Vancouver, Canada, July 2006; Bara, B., Barsalou, L., Bucciarelli, M., Eds.; Available online: http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/Proceedings/2005/docs/p2353.pdf (accessed on 6 February 2011).
32. Lebiere, C.; Gray, R.; Salvucci, D.; West, R.L. Choice and learning under uncertainty: A case study in baseball batting. In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Boston, USA, July 2003; Alterman, R., Kirsh, D., Eds.; Available online: http://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/Proceedings/2003/pdfs/142.pdf (accessed on 6 February 2011).
33. West, R.L.; Lebiere, C.; Bothell, D.J. Cognitive architectures, game playing, and human evolution. In Cognitive Modeling and Multi-Agent Interactions; Sun, R., Ed.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006.
34. Kamans, E.; Otten, S.; Gordijn, E.H.; Spears, R. How groups contest depends on group power and the likelihood that power determines victory and defeat. Group Process Intergroup Relat. 2010, 13, 715-724.