Teaching and learning in a probabilistic prisoner's dilemma

Behavioural Processes

Volumn 57, Issue 2-3, 2002, Pages 211-226

  Baker, Forest ^a   Rachlin, Howard ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Context; Cooperation; Humans; Instructions; Pavlov; Prisoner's dilemma; Strategies; Tit for tat

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR;

ADULT; ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; LEARNING; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PLAY; PROBABILITY; REINFORCEMENT; REWARD;

EID: 0037188182     PISSN: 03766357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0376-6357(02)00015-3     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Selfishness examined: cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives
2. Social dilemmas
3. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games
4. Prisoner's dilemma and the pigeon: control by immediate consequences
5. Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
6. Interpersonal relations: mixed-motive interaction
7. Reciprocity and cooperation in social dilemmas
8. Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma
9. Learning to cooperate with Pavlov: an adaptive strategy for the prisoner's dilemma with noise
10. Evolution of learning among Pavlov strategies in a competitive environment with noise
11. Temporal patterning and choice among delayed outcomes
12. Research on self-control: an integrating framework
13. Pavlov and the evolution of cooperation: an experimental test
14. Solving social dilemmas
15. Individual heuristics and the dynamics of cooperation in large groups
16. A strategy of win-stay-lose shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner's dilemma game
17. Self-control: beyond commitment
18. Reinforcement and punishment in the prisoner's dilemma game
19. Optimal policies for the prisoner's dilemma
20. Prior experience and patterning in a prisoner's dilemma game
21. Cumulative benefit games: achieving cooperation when players discount the future