Informal politics and the state

Comparative Politics

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 351-371

  Radnitz, Scott ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959648453     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5129/001041511795274922     Document Type: Review

References (79)

1. John W. Meyer, John BoIi, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," American Journal of Sociology, 103 (July 1997), 144-81.
2. For example, http://www.gov.uz/en/ and http://www.ceiba-guinea- ecuatorial.org.
3. Kellee Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 38.
4. Of course, there were exceptions; for example, Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
5. Barbara A. Misztal, Informality: Social Theory and Contemporary Practice (New York: Routledge, 2000), 8.
6. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 5.
7. Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions.
8. To Lauth, informal institutions "are based solely on the fact of their existence and their effectiveness.... Informal institutions are equally known and recognized publicly; however, they are not laid down in writing." Hans-Joachim Lauth, "Informal Institutions and Democracy," Democratization, 7 (2000), 24.
9. Freedom House identifies 104 countries with 54 percent of the world's population as "not free" or "partly free." http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70release=756.
10. Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2000);
11. Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East," Comparative Politics, 36 (January 2004), 139-57;
12. Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism In an Age of Democratization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007);
13. Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections Under Authoritarianism," Annual Review of Political Science, 12 (2009), 403-22.
14. Italy, as described by Farrell below, is a good example of a democracy in which informality predominates in important domains.
15. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
16. Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965);
17. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979);
18. T.H. Rigby, Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Altershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).
19. Among the exemplars are Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics, 4 (January 1972), 149-78;
20. James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, 66 (March 1972), 91-113;
21. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
22. For example, see Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979);
23. Michio Morishima, Why has Japan "Succeeded"? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
24. James R. Lincoln and Ame L. Kalleberg, Culture, Control, and Commitment: A Study of Work Organization and Work Attitudes in the United States and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
25. Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MUl and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990);
26. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995);
27. Michael Gerlach, Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
28. John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999);
29. David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
30. Robert Wade, "From 'Miracle' to 'Cronyism': Explaining the Great Asian Slump," Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22 (1998), 693-706;
31. Norman Flynn, Miracle to Meltdown in Asia: Business, Government, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
32. Giuseppe Di Palma, 75 Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990);
33. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Klaus Preuss, Institutional Design in PostCommunist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
34. Bamett R. Rubin and Jack L. Snyder, eds., Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (London and New York: Routledge, 1998);
35. David Stark and László Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
36. Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
37. Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," World Politics, 50 (January 1998), 203-34;
38. Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy, 13 (January 2002), 5-21.
39. Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 6.
40. Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
41. "Solidary groups can potentially reduce free-riding by strengthening group sanctions, promoting social trust, improving skills of cooperation, and encouraging attitudes and habit of cooperation or shifting tastes from particularistic interests... to more community-oriented concerns," 15fh.
42. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), ch. 2.
43. Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Michael Taylor, ed., Rationality and Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988);
44. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
45. John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
46. Gerald M. Easter, "Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined," World Politics, 48 (July 1996), 551-78;
47. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, "From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite" Europe-Asia Studies, 48 (July 1996), 711-33.
48. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
49. Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
50. On brokerage, see Roger V. Gould, "Power and Social Structure in Community Elites," Social Forces, 68 (December 1989), 531-52;
51. Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
52. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965);
53. Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
54. For a contrary view, see Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, "The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: ATheory of the Critical Mass II," American Sociological Review, 53 (February 1988), 1-8.
55. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993);
56. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 1995);
57. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
58. Helmke and Levitsky, 14.
59. Ibid, .
60. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work;
61. Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958);
62. Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
63. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "What Explains Corruption Perceptions? The Dark Side of Political Competition in Russia's Regions," Comparative Politics, 43 (January 2010), 147-66.
64. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
65. For other recent examples, see Edward Schatz, Modem Clan Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004);
66. Jessica Allina-Pisano, The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008);
67. Lauren M. MacLean, Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Cote D'Ivoire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010);
68. Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
69. However, the former is not a flawless solution either. See "Modernizing Russia: Another Great Leap Forward?" Economist, March 11, 2010.
70. Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994);
71. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998);
72. Simona Piattoni, ed., Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
73. Peter Schweizer and Rochelle Schweizer, The Bushes: Portrait of a Dynasty (New York: Anchor Books, 2005).
74. See Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," Politics and Society, 30 (December 2002), 529-54; HiIIeI Soifer and Matthias vom
75. Hau, special issue on "Revisiting State Infrastructural Power," Studies in Comparative and International Development, 43 (2008);
76. Tuong Vu, "Studying the State Through State Formation," World Politics, 62 (January 2010), 148-75.
77. For example, John F. Padgett and Christopher Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology, 98 (1993), 1259-1319;
78. Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology, 102 (September 1996), 400-29;
79. Karen Barkey, "Rebellious Alliances: The State and Peasant Unrest in Early Seventeenth-Century France and the Ottoman Empire," American Sociological Review, 56 (1991), 699-715.