A random graph model of kidney exchanges: Efficiency, individual- rationality and incentives

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 323-332

  Toulis, Panagiotis ^a   Parkes, David C ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

individual rationality; kidney exchange; maximum matching; mechanism design; random graph theory

Indexed keywords

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY; KIDNEY EXCHANGES; MAXIMUM MATCHING; MECHANISM DESIGN; RANDOM GRAPH THEORY;

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; HOSPITALS; LAKES; MACHINE DESIGN;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 79959606259     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993626     Document Type: Conference Paper

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