Increasing the opportunity of live kidney donation by matching for two- and three-way exchanges

Transplantation

Volumn 81, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 773-782

  Saidman, Susan L ^a,g   Roth, Alvin E ^b,c   Sönmez, Tayfun ^d   Ünver, M Utku ^e   Delmonico, Francis L ^f  

^a MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^d BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^f New England Organ Bank   (United States)

^g New England Program for Kidney Exchange   (United States)

Author keywords

Donor; Exchange; Kidney; Paired; Transplant

Indexed keywords

ALLOANTIBODY;

ALGORITHM; ANTIBODY SPECIFICITY; ARTICLE; BLOOD GROUP ABO INCOMPATIBILITY; CLINICAL ASSESSMENT; CLINICAL PROTOCOL; COMPUTER ANALYSIS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; HLA SYSTEM; KIDNEY DONOR; KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION; LIVING DONOR; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RECIPIENT; SAMPLE;

ALGORITHMS; BLOOD GROUP INCOMPATIBILITY; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DIRECTED TISSUE DONATION; HISTOCOMPATIBILITY; HUMANS; KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION; LIVING DONORS; SOFTWARE;

EID: 33645052740     PISSN: 00411337     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. 2004 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients: Transplant Data 1994-2003. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Healthcare Systems Bureau, Division of Transplantation, Rockville, MD; United Network for Organ Sharing, Richmond, VA; University Renal Research and Education Association, Ann Arbor, MI.
2. Cecka JM. Living donor transplants. In: Cecka JM, Terasaki PI, eds. Clinical transplants. Los Angeles: UCLA Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1995: 363.
3. Montgomery RA, Zachary AA, Racusen LC, et al. Plasmapheresis and intravenous immune globulin provides effective rescue therapy for refractory humoral rejection and allows kidneys to be successfully transplanted into crossmatch positive recipients. Transplantation 2000; 70: 887.
4. Jordan SC, Vo A, Bunnapradist S, et al. Intravenous immune globulin treatment inhibits crossmatch positivity and allows for successful transplantation of incompatible organs in living-donor and cadaver recipients. Transplantation 2003; 76: 631.
5. Delmonico FL. Exchanging Kidneys - Advances in Living-Donor Transplantation. N Engl J Med 2004; 350: 1812.
6. Roth AE, Sönmez T, Ünver MU. Kidney Exchange. Quarterly J Econ 2004; 119: 457.
7. Roth AE, Sönmez T, Ünver MU. Pairwise Kidney Exchange. J Econ Theory 2005; 125: 151.
8. Roth AE, Sönmez T, Ünver MU. A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. Am Econ Rev 2005; 95:376.
9. Edmonds J. Paths, Trees, Flowers. Can J Math 1965; 17: 449.
10. Zenios S, Woodle ES., Ross LF. Primum non nocere: Avoiding harm to vulnerable wait list candidates in an indirect kidney exchange. Transplantation 2001; 72: 648.
11. Rapaport FT. The case for a living emotionally related international kidney donor exchange registry. Transplant Proc 1986; 18: 5.
12. Ross LF, Rubin DT, Siegler M, et al. (1997) .Ethics of a paired-kidney-exchange program. NEJM 1997; 336: 1752.
13. Delmonico F, McGowan J, Merion R, Ojo A. Comparative outcomes of unrelated live donor and deceased donor kidney transplantation. Am J Transplant 2004; 4 (Suppl. 8): 593.
14. Delmonico F, Morrissey PE, Lipkowitz GS, et al. Donor kidney exchanges. Am J Transplantation 2004; 4: 1628.
15. Park K, Moon JI, Kim SI, Kim YS. Exchange donor program in kidney transplantation. Transplantation 1999; 67: 336.
16. Montgomery RA, Zachary AA, Ratner LE, et al. Clinical results from transplanting incompatible live kidney donor/recipient pairs using kidney paired donation. JAMA; In press.
17. Lucan M, Rotariu P, Neculoiu D, Iacob G. Kidney exchange program: A viable alternative in countries with low rate of cadaver harvesting. Transplant Proc 2003; 35: 933.
18. de Klerk M, Keizer KM, Class FHJ, et al. The Dutch National Living Donor Kidney Exchange Program. Am J Transplantation 2005: 2302.
19. Roth AE. The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory. J Political Economy 1984; 92: 991.
20. Roth AE. The origins, history, and design of the resident match. JAMA 2003; 289: 909.
21. Roth AE, Peranson E. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. Am Econ Rev 1999; 89: 748.
22. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Sönmez T. School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 2003; 93: 729.
23. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE. The New York City high school match. Am Econ Rev 2005; 95: 364.
24. Abdulkadiroǧlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE, Sönmez T. The Boston Public School Match. Am Econ Rev 2005; 95: 368.
25. Roth Alvin E, Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Ünver M. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market," May, 2005. NBER Working Paper 11402, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11402.
26. Segev DL, Gentry SE, Warren DS, et al. Kidney paired donation and optimizing the use of live donor organs, JAMA 2005; 293: 1883.
27. Fuggle SV, Martin S. Toward performing transplantation in highly sensitized patients, Transplantation 2004; 78: 186.
28. Holden K, Klohe E. Unacceptable antigen identification increases the percentage of compatible final crossmatches (abstract), Human Immunol 2003; 64: S31.