Post-Jihadism: Libya and the global transformations of armed Islamist movements

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 377-397

  Ashour, Omar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

De radicalization; Disengagement; Ending political violence; Islamism; Jihad; Libya; Middle East; North Africa; Radicalization; Security; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 79958757485     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: 15561836     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.560218     Document Type: Article

References (170)

1. He is also the Chairman of the al-Qaddafi Foundation for Development (QFD).
2. For accuracy and clarification, the Fighting Group does not refer to itself as "Libyan" in any of its publications. The acronym LIFG can be misleading, despite being common in both Western media and academic literature. Whereas the group principally operated in Libya and was mainly composed of Libyan militants, it had an international component, with members from more than ten different countries. Moreover, its principal ideologue asserted that the organization never saw itself as a nationalist group. It believed in international jihadism before its de-radicalization phase, and its members fought in several countries including Algeria, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia (see for example al-Sa'idi, Abu al-Mundhir. Interview, Bayariq al-Majd, January 1997).
3. See Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 140-145.
4. Omar Ashour, "De-Radicalizing Jihadists: The Libyan Way", Arab Reform Bulletin (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010).
5. Camille Al-Tawil, "Mu'taqalun min al-Jama'a al-Muqatila Yuridun Ishrak Qadatahum fi al-Kharij fi al-Hiwar Detainees from the Fighting Group Want to Include their Leaders Abroad in the Dialogue", al-Hayat, 28 January 2007.
6. For in-depth analyses of these transformations see Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 140-145.
7. Omar Ashour, "The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on al-Qaida", Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 5 (Spring 2008).
8. Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures", The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008).
9. Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 596-627.
10. Omar Ashour, "Hamas and the Prospects of De-Radicalization", in Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics, edited by Klejda Mulaj (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
11. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York, London: Routledge, 2009).
12. Chris Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy", Carnegie Papers, September 2008.
13. Audrey Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends?" International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7-48.
14. John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009).
15. Sidney Jones, "Deradicalization and Indonesian Prisons", International Crisis Group Report, 19 November 2007.
16. Also see Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
17. Jessica Stern, "Mind over Martyr", Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (Jan=Feb 2010): 95-106.
18. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (Sheikh Said) and Yusuf al-Dardiri (Abu Ayyub al-Masri) respectively.
19. His aliases include Dr Fadl and Abd al-Qadir Ibn Abd al-Aziz.
20. Dr. Muhyiddin Kabiri, Chairperson of the Islamic Renaissance Party in Tajikistan. Interview by author, 13 October 2009.
21. Dr. Abd al-Rahman al-Hadlag, Director of the Ideological Security Directorate and Senior Advisor for the Saudi Ministry of Interior. Interview by author, 26 February 2009.
22. "Qa'idat al-Maghrib Tastahdif Qyadi Islamii Jaza'iri Bariz" (al-Qaida in the Maghreb Targets a Leading Algerian Islamist", Al-Jazeera, 23 August 2007.
23. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Tabri' at Ummat al-Jihad wa al-Qalam min Tihmat al-Da'f wa al-Khawar [The Vindication of the Nation of the Sword and the Pen from the Demeaning Charge of Cowardice and Weakness (Publisher Unknown, 2008).
24. Abu Qatada Al-Falstini, "Hiwar Ma' al-Sheikh Abu Qatada min Dakhil al-Sujun al-Britanniya (An Interview with Sheikh Abu Qatada from within British Prisons)", Interview by Adel A. Majid, Minbar al-Tawhid, 5 June 2008.
25. Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group".
26. Omar Ashour, "The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on al-Qaida", Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 5 (Spring 2008).
27. Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures", The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008).
28. Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 140-145.
29. Omar Ashour, "Hamas and the Prospects of De-Radicalization", in Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics, edited by Klejda Mulaj (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
30. Omar Ashour, "Online De-Radicalization? Countering the Violent Extremist Narratives: The Message, Messenger, and Media Strategy", Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 6 (2010). http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=144&Itemid=54.
31. Tore Bjørgo, "Reducing recruitment and promoting disengagement from extremist groups: The case of racist sub-cultures", In C. Benard (ed.), A Future for the Young (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).
32. John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2009).
33. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York, London: Routledge, 2009).
34. John Horgan refers to these programs as "risk reduction" programs (John Horgan, "Disengagement and De-Radicalization from Terrorism", Presentation given at the Seminar for the Study of Terrorism, Ortega-Maranon Foundation, Madrid, Spain, 18 November 2010).
35. Chris Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy", Carnegie Papers, September 2008.
36. Jessica Stern, "Mind over Martyr", Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (Jan=Feb 2010): 95-106.
37. The terms will be defined in the following sections.
38. Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 598.
39. For a typology of Islamists, see Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 7-11.
40. See for example Abbud al-Zumur, Al-Tariq al-Thalith: Bayna al-Istibbdad wa al-Istislam (The Third Way: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender) (Cairo: [No Publisher], 2009).
41. Osama Rushdi, "Min al-Maraja'at ila al-Muhatarat: Mata Yarud Sayyid Imam 'ala Nafsuh (From Revisions to Pitiful Jokes: When Will Sayyid Imam Respond to Himself?)", Al-Masry al-Youm, 28 December 2008, 6.
42. For more on the ideological tenets and the behavioral implications of Post-Jihadism, see Omar Ashour, "Post-Jihadism and the Inevitability of Democratization", Arab Reform Bulletin (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009).
43. Omar Ashour, "Post-Jihadism and Ideological De-Radicalization", in Contextualizing Jihadi Ideologies, edited by Zaheer Kazimi and Jeevan Doel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 (forthcoming).
44. Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 6-7; 11-12.
45. See also Carrie Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party", Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 2004): 208-228.
46. Janine Clark, "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan", International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38, no. 24 (November 2006): 539-560.
47. Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
48. In some of the literature, this is referred to as "disengagement" (see for example Bjørgo and Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind). I use a qualification to distinguish between behavioral disengagement from political violence and organizational disengagement from a group. In collective de-radicalization the group usually remains intact, with the leadership keeping the command and control structure. The group as a whole abandons political violence without its members "disengaging", "exiting", or "dropping out" from it.
49. The "other" is defined here as any social actor or entity who=which is not a jihadist or who=which is not recognized by the movement(s)=individual(s) under study as "jihadist. ".
50. See Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 140-145.
51. Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 596-627.
52. Omar Ashour, "The Impact of Egyptian Islamist Revisionists on al-Qaida", Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 5 (Spring 2008).
53. See also Gordon Clubb, "Re-Evaluating Disengagement Processes: The Case of Fatah", Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 3 (September 2009): 26-27.
54. Peter Neuman, "Prisons and Terrorism", ICSR Report (London: ICSR, 2010), 42-44.
55. See Carrie Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party", Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (January 2004), 211.
56. Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi does not hold any official governmental position (at the time this article was written). However, being the son of the Libyan leader, he is influential enough to challenge security bosses who were not supportive of de-radicalization processes.
57. General Lamari was the Deputy-Head of the Algerian Military Intelligence, and was the main figure in supporting the Algerian de-radicalization processes. For more details about his role, see Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 59-62; 112-127.
58. Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures", The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008), 2-4.
59. General Ra'fat (alias Mustafa Rifa'at) was the Deputy-Head of the Egyptian State Security Investigations (ESSI) and, formerly, the head of the Countering Religious Activism Unit in ESSI. He is widely believed to be the engineer of the new policy towards the IG after 9=11 and the main guarantor of its continuity.
60. Prince Muhammad Ibn Nayif is the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister for Counterterrorism Affairs. He is the founder and the main sponsor of the Saudi De-Radicalization Program (al-Munasaha).
61. Al-Hadlag, Interview by author, 26 February 2009.
62. Majid Nawaz, "Muffakir Hizb al-Tahrir Yutalliq al-Usuliyya (The Ideologue of the Liberation Party Abandons Fundamentalism). " Interview by Muhammad al-Shaf'i, al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 September 2005, 1, 5.
63. Omar Ashour, "Hamas and the Prospects of De-Radicalization", in Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics, edited by Klejda Mulaj (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
64. Muhammad Abu Shama, "Munazir al-Jihad al-Masry (The Ideologue of Egyptian Jihad)", Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 23 April 2009, 1.
65. Noman Benotman, Former Shura Council Member of the LIFG, Interview by author, 27 April 2010.
66. Sami al-Sa'idi (Abu al-Mundhir), al-Khutut al-'Arida fi Manhajj al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila (Generic Guidelines in the Way of the Islamic Fighting Group) (Peshawar: [No Publisher], 1998), 105-120.
67. Sami al-Sa'idi (Abu al-Mundhir), al-Khutut al-'Arida fi Manhajj al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila (Generic Guidelines in the Way of the Islamic Fighting Group) (Peshawar: [No Publisher], 1998), 105-106.
68. Specifically the IG's charter entitled Mithaq al-'Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Charter).
69. Abdullah Salah al-Din, [Anonymous Interviewer], al-Fajr, February 1996. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 27 April 2010.
70. This was the preferred paramilitary strategy of the Egyptian al-Jihad Organization in the early 1980s.
71. Benotman, Interview by author, 27 April 2010.
72. These include security, media, political, documents (forgery), and theological= ideological (legitimate) committees.
73. Both Noman Benotman and Sami al-Sa'idi describe this practice as a "mistake. ".
74. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 11 June 2009.
75. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 11 June 2009.
76. The camp was in Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. It belonged to the Islamic Union of Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, but the LIFG was running and administering it.
77. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 11 June 2009.
78. In organizational terms, "station" (mahatta in Arabic) is a geographical location in which the group has logistical support and organizational ties. This includes the ownership of residences, safe-houses, and the presence of embedded members. Any visiting LIFG member or supporter would find contacts, accommodation, and various types of material support in a "station. ".
79. The most notable of those figures is al-Qary Said (Nasr al-Din Wahabi), who played the major role in establishing the ties between Algerian-Afghans and the GIA. He can be considered the founder of the "Afghan" faction in the GIA.
80. Abdullah Salah al-Din, [Anonymous Interviewer], al-Fajr, February 1996.
81. The LNSF is a multi-ideological, nationalist organization that led the armed opposition against al-Qaddafi's regime in the 1980s. It was largely undermined and marginalized by the early 1990s.
82. Known earlier as al-Jihad Organization of Libya, its commander Muhammad al-Hami (Abu al-Bara') changed its name to The Martyrs. It was a small Jihadist organization based primarily in Benghazi and its suburbs. Like the LIFG, it was composed of Libyan veterans of the Afghan conflict.
83. Abdullah Salah al-Din, [Anonymous Interviewer], al-Fajr, February 1996.
84. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 27 April 2010.
85. Abu Bakr al-Sharif, Former Spokesperson of the LIFG, [Anonymous Interviewer], Nida' al-Islam, October 1997.
86. Abu Bakr al-Sharif, [Anonymous Interviewer], Nida' al-Islam, October 1997.
87. Benotman, Interview by author, 11 June 2009. The case of the Libyan-Afghans in Algeria is a very complicated one. Due to space limitations, I will not be able to examine it here. However, it merits further investigation, to understand the internal dynamics and the rifts between Jihadist movements in general and in North Africa in particular.
88. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 1 September 2009.
89. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 11 July 2010.
90. LIFG Communiqué dated 14 September 1997.
91. Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, Speech at the Press Conference entitled "National Reconciliation in Libya", Tripoli, Libya, 23 March 2010.
92. These were Saad al-Firjani (Wahid), Salih Abd al-Sayyid (Abu Yahya), Abd al-Hakim al-'Ammari (Abu Muslim), and A. S. Zakaria (killed in the Abu Selim Prison massacre).
93. Other accounts place the figure at more than 1,320 fatalities, including around 120 prisoners executed a day earlier, on 28 June 1996. See for example the Human Rights Watch report: http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=mideast&c=libya and the LSNF report about the massacre at: http://www.nfsl-libya.com/Studies/5065.htm.
94. Anonymous. Witness to Abu Selim Massacre. Interview by author, June 2010.
95. In which the IG declared a unilateral ceasefire in July 1997 and the regime swiftly rejected it. This was followed by a crackdown on the IG members who had declared the ceasefire, as well as on the media outlets that reported it. However, after 9=11, the regime started to coordinate with the IG leadership and to support de-radicalization efforts.
96. Mainly figures from the MB and the LNSF, including Sheikh Ali al-Sallabi, Mr. Ashur al-Shamis, Mr. Aly R. Abuzaakuk, and others.
97. Sheikh Salabi is influenced by the Muslim Brothers' ideological trend and the views of Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi. (Ali al-Sallabi,. Interview by author. 23 March 2010).
98. Sabry Hilala, Major in the Libyan Internal Security Services (LISS). Meeting with the author, 23 March 2010.
99. Noman Benotman, Interview by author, 21 August 2009.
100. Most notably Generals Abdullah al-Sonosi and Abdullah Mansour.
101. Abd al-Hakim Belhajj, Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq. Emir of the LIFG. Interview by author, 23 March 2010. Ali al-Sallabi, Interview by author, 22 March 2010.
102. Khaled al-Tuhami, Speech given at the Conference entitled "Swords into Ploughshares: Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration", Tripoli, Libya, 23 March 2010.
103. Which Saif al-Islam described as a "pioneering work. ".
104. Otherwise known as Jihaz Amn al-Jamahiriyya (The Populist Republic's Security Apparatus).
105. The credentials can range from a degree from a prestigious university like al-Azhar of Egypt (such as the degree held by Omar Abd al-Rahman and other IG leaders) or Umm al-Qura in Mecca (such as the degree held by Safar al-Hawali) to informal self-teaching and, based on that, showing a command of theological knowledge and issuing fatwas (like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi of Jordan and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif of Egypt).
106. Participating in armed action against a perceived "secular" and repressive regime or against a foreign force would usually count as a history of struggle in the eyes of followers.
107. Like being the Emir, the former Emir, or a member in the leadership council (usually called the consultative council or the elite council in armed Islamist movements).
108. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010.
109. As previously mentioned, the Council is the highest executive body of the LIFG.
110. This is the older brother of Hassan Qaid (Abu Yahya al-Libi), currently believed to be the third in line within al-Qaida's leadership structure. Abu Yahya was not a member of the LIFG's Shura Council, though he was a member of its Legitimate Committee.
111. The names of the last three leaders will be kept anonymous.
112. This is an alias.
113. According to the supporters of de-radicalization, 'Urwa is incommunicado and therefore they argue that his rejection is not confirmed.
114. This conclusion is based on meetings and interviews conducted with four LIFG senior commanders, 13 members, and several LISS officials in Tripoli (Libya) and London (UK). The fact that the Libyan government continued releasing LIFG members and judges the de-radicalization process to be a "success" indicates that support for Abu Layth's stance among the members is relatively unlikely. Some of the internal dynamics within the LIFG will be discussed further in the section on internal interactions.
115. For elaboration see Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 98-101.
116. Muhammad Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel? Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 20-23.
117. Quintan Wicktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism: Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 17-19.
118. See also Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).
119. When al-Zawahiri imposed a ban on any operation inside Egypt due to lack of capacity (see for Hani al-Siba'i, "Al-Islami al-Misri Hani al-Siba'i Yakshif Qisat Intiqal Imarat al-Jihad min Imam ila al-Zawhri (The Egyptian Islamist Hani al-Siba'i Uncovers the Transfer of Leadership of al-Jihad from Imam to al-Zawahiri)", Interview by Camille Al-Tawil, Al-Hayat, 3 September 2002, 10.
120. Like the case of Muhammad al-Graw (Abdullah Radwan), an LIFG member who threw a grenade at Colonel Qaddafi in 1996. As a result, the house of his parents was razed.
121. The most notable case is that of two of the LIFG Shura Council members: Saad al-Firjani (Wahid) and Salih A. Sayyid (Abu Yahya), whose bodies were publicly displayed in front of the LISS Headquarters in Derna in 1996.
122. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010.
123. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010.
124. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010. Sami Al-Sa'ida, Principal Ideologue of the LIFG, Meeting with the author, 23 March 2010.
125. Although that effect is usually temporal and conditioned, mainly depending on the reintegration process. In the Egyptian, Algerian, and Yemeni cases, several experts have argued that the prisons are sometimes more merciful for former militants than daily life in society (see for example Diaa Rashwan, "Hal Yakun al-Sijin Akthar Rahma min al-Watan? (Can the Prison be More Merciful than the Homeland)", al-Masry al-Youm, 23 August 2007, 6.
126. Ra'uf al-Minaway, "Madha Ba'd al-Muraja'at? (What's After the Revisions?" al-Masry al-Youm, 7 December 2007, 6.
127. Omar Ashour, "Ending Jihadism: The Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements", Arab Reform Bulletin (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009).
128. Omar Ashour, "Post-Jihadism and the Inevitability of Democratization", Arab Reform Bulletin (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009).
129. For details of some of those interaction cases and the domino effect, see Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 618-621; 12-13.
130. Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 12-15, 51-73, 85-88.
131. Muhammad Bin Ali, Member of Religious Rehabilitation Group in Singapore, Interview by author, Singapore, 25 February 2009.
132. Sheikh al-Sallabi was specifically referring to three of the LIFG leaders: Abu al-Mundhir (principal ideologue), Abu Idris (brother of Abu Yahya and the Shura Council member), and Abu Tumama (Noman Benotman).
133. Ali Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
134. Ali Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
135. The details of these discussions are crucial to understanding the jihadi mindset and beliefs. However, due to space limitations, I will not be able to outline them in this article. This will be feasible in forthcoming works.
136. Ali Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
137. Belhajj, Interview by author, 23 March 2010.
138. See for example the role of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the former American-Egyptian political prisoner and human rights activist, in Omar Ashour, "Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of the Egyptian Islamic Group", Middle East Journal 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), 618-620.
139. Omar Ashour, The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), 97-98.
140. For the Algerian case and the role of interactions between Islamists and non-Islamists in exile, see Omar Ashour, "Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures", The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008), 9-10.
141. For the Saudi case, see Chris Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy", Carnegie Papers, September 2008, 8-9.
142. Also see Chris Boucek. "Extremist Re-education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia", in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York: Routledge, 2009).
143. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010. Ali Al-Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
144. Ali Al-Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
145. Sami Al-Sa'idi, Meeting with the author, 23 March 2010.
146. And to a lesser extent in the case of al-Jihad Organization and smaller Islamist groups at a later stage.
147. In the Libyan case, Abu Selim is a military base that has a detention facility. It is not a "prison" in the common sense of the word.
148. Ali Al-Sallabi, Speech given at the Conference entitled "Swords into Ploughshares: Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration", Tripoli, Libya, 23 March 2010.
149. The condition of Tariq Ghunnay is one example. Like Abu Yahya al-Libi of al-Qaida, he was a member of the Legitimate Committee and a mid-ranking commander in the LIFG. The LISS helped to get him a job in a supermarket as the "only available option. ".
150. Interview by author, May 2010.
151. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010.
152. Benotman, Interview by author, 3 May 2010.
153. Ali Abu Zakouk, Former Leader in the LNSF, Interview by author, 11 July 2010.
154. Ali Al-Sallabi, Interview by author, 12 May 2010.
155. A similar conclusion can be drawn in the other reintegration cases as well, including those of Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, and Tajikistan.
156. Dr. Abd al-Rahman al-Hadlag, General Director of the Ideological Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior. Interview by author, 19 February 2009.
157. Dr. Abd al-Rahman al-Hadlag, General Director of the Ideological Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior. Interview by author, 19 February 2009.
158. Dr. Abd al-Rahman al-Hadlag, General Director of the Ideological Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior. Interview by author, 19 February 2009.
159. For more details about the Saudi program, see Chris Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy", Carnegie Papers, September 2008.
160. Chris Boucek, "Extremist Re-education and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia", in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (eds.), Leaving Terrorism Behind (New York: Routledge, 2009).
161. Colonel al-Qaddafi admitted for the first time that the massacre had occurred in 2006, ten years later. For some of the details, see Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Country Report", New York: HRW Publications, January 2010.
162. See also Khalid al-Mahir, "Libiyun Yushakikun fi Tahqiqat Abu Selim (Libyans Suspect the Investigations of Abu Selim", Al-Jazeera, 7 February 2010.
163. Khalid al-Mahir, "Ta'athur Juhud al-Masalaha al-Wataniya fi Libya (Efforts of National Reconciliation Retreat in Libya)", Al-Jazeera, 2 April 2010. In comparative perspective, this is a major development in Libya. For example, the equivalent in Syria would be President Bashar al-Asad opening the file on the Hama massacre of 1982 and compensating the families whose members were killed in the indiscriminate airstrikes. In Egypt, the equivalent would be efforts by Gamal Mubarak to open the files of al-Wadi al-Jadid (New Valley), al-'Aqrab (Scorpion), and other prisons from the 1990s, and to compensate the victims of mass-torture and their families.
164. Saif al-Islam urged the Libyan fighters abroad to return home. He specifically mentioned the fighters in the following countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Iraq. Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, Speech in "National Reconciliation in Libya", Tripoli, Libya, 23 March 2010.
165. These include non-violent Islamists, Islamic scholars and clerics, and credible human rights activists and secular civil society figures.
166. For some of the debates, see Francois Burgat, "Ballot Boxes, Military and Islamic Movements", in Martin Kramer (ed), The Islamism Debate (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, 1997).
167. Muhammad Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel? Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 20-23.
168. Asim Abd al-Majid, "Muraja'a Sayyid Imam (The Revisions of Sayyid Imam)", al-Jarida, 3 December 2007, 13.
169. See for example Belhajj et al., Mafahim Tashihiyya fi al-Jihad wa al-Hisba wa al-Hukum 'ala al-Nass (Corrective Understandings in Jihad, Morality Enforcement, and the Judgment of People), (Tripoli: [no publisher), 2009), 183-189.
170. Nagih Ibrahim, al-Ajniha al-Musallaha Jarrat al-Islamiyin lil 'Unf (The Armed Wings Dragged Islamists to Violence)", [Online] (10 May 2007). Available: http://egyig.org/Public/articles/announce/6/78784019.shtml (Accessed 13 June 2007).