How al-Qaida ends: The decline and demise of terrorist groups

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 7-48

  Cronin, Audrey Kurth ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b University's International Relations Faculty   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 33747155020     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.7     Document Type: Article

References (174)

1. On this point, see Frederick Schulze, "Breaking the Cycle: Empirical Research and Postgraduate Studies on Terrorism," in Andrew Silke, ed., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, and failures (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 161-185.
2. See, for example, "CIA Chief Has 'Excellent Idea' Where bin Laden Is," June 22, 2005, http:// www.cnn.com/2005/US/06/20/goss.bin.laden/index. html.
3. Andrew Silke, "The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research," in Silke, Research on Terrorism, p. 191.
4. Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," in Silke, Research on Terrorism, pp. 1-29.
5. Silke, Research on Terrorism, pp. 208-209.
6. Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines" Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 73;
7. and Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States," Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 1989), pp. 407-408.
8. Examples of articles on the drivers of terrorism include Michael Mousseau, "Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 5-29;
9. and Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 30-58.
10. See also Charles Knight and Melissa Murphy, and Michael Mousseau, "Correspondence: The Sources of Terrorism," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Fall 2003), pp. 192-198.
11. For more on this argument, especially as it relates to the causes of terrorism, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Sources of Contemporary Terrorism," in Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), pp. 19-45, especially p. 22.
12. See United States Institute of Peace, "How Terrorism Ends," Special Report, No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 1999), especially the overview section written by Martha Crenshaw, pp. 2-4.
13. For example, Bruce Hoffman compares al-Qaida to the archetypal shark that must continue swimming to survive. See, for example, Ann Scott Tyson, "Al-Qaeda Broken, but Dangerous," Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2002.
14. See also Martha Crenshaw, "Decisions to Use Terrorism: Psychological Constraints on Instrumental Reasoning," International Social Movements Research, Vol. 4 (1992), pp. 29-42.
15. Among numerous sources on these subjects, see Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the Twenty-first Century," Political Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 405-420;
16. Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, Stales of Mind, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. 7-24;
17. and Jerrold Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic," in Reich, Origins of Terrorism, pp. 25-10.
18. This approach is well established in criminology and intelligence analysis. See, for example, Irene Jung Fiala, "Anything New? The Racial Profiling of Terrorists," Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 53-58;
19. Rex A. Hudson, Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons, 2002);
20. and Paul R. Pillar, "Counterterrorism after al-Qaeda," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), p. 105. As Pillar points out, the Transportation Security Administration already uses profiling to screen airline passengers. Ibid.
21. See, for example, Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, "Education, Poverty, Political Violence, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" Working Paper, No. 9074 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002), p. 2;
22. Alan Richards, Socio-economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, July 2003);
23. Daniel Pipes, "God. and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" National Interest, No. 66 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 14-21;
24. and Gary T. Dompsoy, "Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation Building to Combat Terrorism," Policy Analysis Series, No. 429 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, March 21, 2002).
25. See, for example, Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 156-176.
26. For an organizational analysis of terrorist groups, see David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations, 2d ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
27. Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," in Rapoport, Inside Terrorist Organizations, pp. 19-27.
28. See, for example, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arguilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999);
29. John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001);
30. and Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 97-108;
31. and Matthew Levitt, "Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups," SAIS Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004), pp. 33-48.
32. Steve Coll and Susan B. Classer, "Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations," Washing ton Post, August 7, 2005;
33. Craig Whitlock, "Briton Used Internet as His Bully Pulpit," Washington Post, August 8, 2005;
34. and Susan B. Glasser, and Steve Coll, "The Web as Weapon: Zarqawi Intertwines Acts on Ground in Iraq with Propaganda Campaign on the Internet," Washington Post, August 9, 2005.
35. United States Institute of Peace, "How Terrorism Ends," p. 1.
36. David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism," in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds., Routledge Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1067. This claim admittedly needs to be updated. A good study of the life span of terrorist organizations, including those that gained purchase in the 1990s, is still waiting to be written.
37. In discussing the longevity of terrorist groups, Martha Crenshaw notes only three significant groups with ethnonationalist ideologies that ceased to exist within ten years of their formation. One of these, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, or EOKA), disbanded because its goal - the liberation of Cyprus - was achieved. By contrast, a majority of the terrorist groups that she lists as having existed for ten years or longer have recognizable ethnonationalist ideologies, including the Irish Republican Army (in its many forms), Sikh separatist groups, Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA), various Palestinian nationalist groups, and the Corsican National Liberation Front. See Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," pp. 69-87.
38. David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 658-677. Rapoport asserts that before the nineteenth century, religion was the only acceptable cause for terrorism, providing a transcendent purpose that rose above the treacherous and petty political concerns of man.
39. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 73.
40. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism, 1968-2000: Thresholds, Persistence, and Forecasts," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 71, No. 3 (January 2004), pp. 467-482;
41. Todd Sandier, Walter Enders, and Harvey E. Lapan, "Economic Analysis Can Help Fight International Terrorism," Challenge, January/February 1991, pp. 10-17;
42. and Walter Enders and Todd Sandier, "Is Transnational Terrorism Becoming More Threatening? A Time-Series Investigation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 3 (June 2000), pp. 307-332.
43. Jonathan David Farley, "Breaking Al-Qaida Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and. Decision Making)," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 399-411.
44. See also Bernard Harris, "Mathematical Methods in Combatting Terrorism," Risk Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4 (August 2004), pp. 985-988.
45. For example, referring to the case study of the Weathermen, Ehud Sprinzak argues that left-wing groups evolve through three stages: crisis of confidence, conflict of legitimacy, and crisis of legitimacy. See Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weatherman," in Reich, Origins of Terrorism, pp. 65-85.
46. For another argument about the psychological phases for terrorist groups, see Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in Reich, Origins of Terrorism, pp. 161-191.
47. Leonard Weinberg and Louise Richardson, "Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe," in Silke, Research on Terrorism, pp. 138-160.
48. Ehud Sprinzak, "Right-Wing Terrorism in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization," in Tore Bjorgo, ed., Terrorism from the Extreme Right (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 17-43.
49. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970). There is a rich literature from the 1960s and 1970s on political violence, of which terrorism is arguably a subset. Gurr defines political violence as "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actor-including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies." Ibid., pp. 3-4.
50. Cronshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 82.
51. See also John O. Voll, "Bin Laden and the New Age of Global Terrorism," Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 1-5;
52. and Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Framing Jihad: Intra-movement Framing Contests and al-Qaida's Struggle for Sacred Authority," International Review of Social History, Vol. 49, Supp. 12 (December 2004), pp. 159-177.
53. David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," in Cronin and Ludes, Attacking Terrorism, pp. 46-73;
54. and David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," Current History, December 2001, pp. 419-424.
55. The best of these is Martha Crenshaw's edited book Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), because it examines both the evolution of terrorist organizations and the counter terrorist techniques used against them. It explains terrorism as part of broader processes of political and social change. Reflecting its own historical context, however, there is a strong bias toward left-wing and ethnonationalist/ separatist groups.
56. In the wake of September 11, Yonah Alexander produced an edited volume of comparative case studies, Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), which emphasizes counterterrorist techniques used mainly against European groups.
57. Another promising study is Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, Democracy and Terrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming).
58. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 70.
59. Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, pp. 3-24. One interesting comparative study of terrorist groups in two countries, Canada and the United States, concluded that four factors led to terrorism's decline: preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash. Its applicability was limited by the small number of cases, however.
60. Jeffrey Ian Ross and Ted Robort Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United. States," Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 1989), pp. 405-426.
61. Crenshaw argues that the decline of terrorism results from the interplay of three factors: the government's response, the choices of the terrorist group, and the organization's resources. See Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 80.
62. In another article, she further explores the internal and external factors, pointing to how government strategies such as deterrence, enhanced defense, and negotiations interact with terrorist group success, organizational breakdown, dwindling support, and new alternatives for terrorist organizations. See United States Institute of Peace, "How Terrorism Ends," pp. 2-5.
63. See the annual U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism (which, beginning in 2004, replaced Patterns of Global Terrorism) at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt. In 2003 the PKK was renamed Kongra-Gel, which continues to be a designated group.
64. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2004), pp. 103-105, Order Code RL32223.
65. Guzmán was sentenced, to life in prison in 1992, but the trial was later ruled, unconstitutional; he is scheduled to be retried (for a second time). His successor, Oscar Ramírez Duran, also known as Feliciano, continued to direct the movement after Guzmán's capture; but as mentioned earlier, the group's membership sharply plummeted. The State Department has estimated, its strength at between 400 and 500 members, down from as many as 10,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, April 2004, http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/31912.pdf.
66. Duran was likewise captured in July 1999. Some analysts worry that the group may resurge, with notable attacks in 2002 and 2003. See Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, p. 103.
67. Although possible, resurgence on a large scale is unlikely: the capture of Guzmán was clearly a watershed. See also Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism.
68. For an explanation of the meaning of this term and. other main typologies of terrorism, see Cronin, "Behind, the Curve," pp. 39-42.
69. "U.S. Welcomes Ocalan Capture," Agence France-Presse, February 16, 1999. Ocalan's sentence was later commuted to life in prison.
70. "Turkey Lifts Ocalan Death Sentence," BBC News, October 3, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2296679.stm.
71. Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, pp. 53-55.
72. Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Ibid., pp. 88-89;
73. and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003.
74. Cronin et al., foreign Terrorist Organizations, pp. 17-19;
75. and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, According to the State Department, in July 2001 a small group of Aum members was arrested in Russia before it could follow through with its plan to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, free Asahara, and smuggle him into Russia.
76. Direct Action's four principal leaders, Joelle Aubron, Georges Cipriani, Nathalie Menigon, and Jean-Marc Rouillan, were arrested in February 1987, followed shortly thereafter by Max Frerot, effectively dismantling the leadership of the group and putting an end to its activities. Members of the People's Liberation Forces killed their own deputy leader when she appeared to be interested in negotiating with the Salvadoran government; the leader of the group, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, committed suicide shortly thereafter, resulting in the disintegration of the group and essentially its absorption into a larger organization, the Farabundo Martí National liberation Front. After a four-day siege of their compound in April 1985, eight leaders of the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord were arrested and imprisoned, effectively ending the group. The Chilean group Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents essentially ceased to exist because of the arrest of its key leaders in the 1990s. The latter reached a peace agreement with the Salvadoran government in 1991. See the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, a database of domestic and international terrorist organizations, at http://www.tkb.org.
77. Che Guevara was captured and killed by the Bolivian army in October 1967 and subsequently became a legendary figure who inspired leftist and separatist groups in Latin America and throughout the world. Leila Ali Khaled of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine carried the book My Friend Che with her when she hijacked TWA flight 840 in August 1969. In the United States, the Weathermen also organized massive protests on the second anniversary of die's death. Harvey Kushner, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003), pp. 155-156, 372, 406.
78. I am grateful to Mia Bloom for sharing this observation.
79. Sheikh Omar is the leader of the Egyptian al-Gama al-Islamiya, which is closely tied with Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Although imprisoned for life in the United States, he has continued to call on his followers to engage in violence, especially against Jews. He was also convicted for plotting to bomb the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels and the United Nations building and to assassinate Senator Alphonse D'Amato and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. See, for example, Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's 2002), p. 274.
80. Members of the Baader-Meinhof group engaged in violence during numerous attempts to free their imprisoned comrades, for example. The Blind Sheikh has also prompted violence aimed at his release. Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (2002), p. 274. Ibid.
81. For an explanation of the major types of terrorist organizations, see Cronin, "Behind the Curve," pp. 39-42.
82. The Red Army Faction, a successor of the Baader-Meinhof group, arguably continued for some years and transitioned to what it called its "third generation," with claims of attacks in the name of the RAF during the 1980s and early 1990s. The degree to which it truly was the same group is debatable. In any case, the dissolution of the Soviet Union severely undermined its ideology. See entry in MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base.
83. Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," p. 78.
84. On right-wing groups, see Cronin, "Behind the Curve," pp. 39-42.
85. These include the Christian Patriots, the Aryan Nations, the Ku Klux Klan, and The Order (a short-lived faction of Aryan Nations) in the United States, as well as the Anti-Zionist Movement in Italy and the National Warriors of South Africa.
86. In the United States, the Ku Klux Klan is a notable example.
87. Some groups, such as The Order (active between 1982 and 1984), have been idolized by their admirers and continue to exercise influence.
88. The concept of "leaderless existence" apparently originated with Col. Ulius Louis Amoss, who wrole an essay with this as the title in 1962. It was later popularized by Louis R. Beam Jr., Aryan Nations leader and former Texas Ku Klux Klan Grand Dragon leader. See Beam, "Leaderless Resistance," The Seditionist, No. 12 (February 1992).
89. During much of this period, the African National Congress was labeled a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of Defense but not by the U.S. State Department.
90. The South-West African People's Organization underwent a similar transition: from orchestrating bombings in banks, stores, schools, and service stations to governing Namibia.
91. For example, among those that had outside protectors, Laqueur includes the Palestinian Arab groups and the Croatian Ustasha. For those facing imperial powers not able to hold on to colonies, he includes the IRA (Britain and Ireland after World War I), the Irgun (Britain and the Palestine Mandate after World Wir II), and the EOKA (Britain and Cyprus, also after World Wir II). Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p. 118.
92. The talks have stopped and started several times, and at this writing are threatened by renewed violence; however, it looks as if they will result in limited Tamil autonomy.
93. Other splinter groups include the Continuity IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army.
94. For a discussion of this problem, see Fred Charles Tike, Every War Must End, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 84-105.
95. Negotiations, however, complicate a terrorist organization's efforts to perpetuate its own absolutist perspective in justifying the use of terrorist violence. See Adrian Guolke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 162-181.
96. Franco Ferracuti, "Ideology and Repentance: Terrorism in Italy," in Reich, Origins of Terrorism, pp. 59-64;
97. and Leonard Weinberg, "Italy and the Red Brigades," in Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism.
98. Other examples cited by Art and Richardson include amnesties or other incentives given to members of the ETA, the Shining Path, the FALN, the IRA, and the Tamil Tigers, with degrees of success related to whether members of a group perceived it as likely to prevail. See "Conclusion," in Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism.
99. Peter A. Lupsha," Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories versus Indignation," Politics and Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Fall 1971), pp. 89-104;
100. and Luigi Bonanate, "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 16, No. 3 (May 1979), pp. 197-211.
101. Terrorist operations, albeit shocking and tragic, at least as often increase the level of public support for the cause and indeed are designed to do so. Examples include the PLO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, the IRA, and nineteenth-century Russian terrorist groups. See Laqueur, Terrorism.
102. See Sean Boyne, "The Real IRA: After Omagh, What Now?" Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1998, http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europo/ news/jir/jir980824_1_n.shtml.
103. MIPT database incident profile, http://64.233.167.104/search?q?cache: vBXLiW4gwekJ:www.tkb.org/Incident. jsp%3FincID%3D372+popular+revulsion+terrorist+group&hl=en.
104. The PFLP-GC has ties with Syria and Libya and may have had a role in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. See Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, pp. 80-82;
105. and Kenneth Katzman, The PLO find Its Factions, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2002), Order Code RS21235. The state sponsorship of this group from the 1980s may have reduced its dependency on a local constituency.
106. See, for example, Goldie Shabad and Francisco José Llera Ramo, "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, pp. 410-469, especially pp. 455-462.
107. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 84-101.
108. See also C. Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 125-156.
109. Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies."
110. For more on state sponsorship, see Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
111. On intervention, see Adam Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective," Survival, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 115-121.
112. For recent work on this subject, see Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 5-63;
113. and Mark Kramer, "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen Conflict," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2 (March 2005), pp. 209-290.
114. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) claims that Russian forces suffered 4,749 casualties between August 2002 and August 2003, the highest figure since the second Chechen conflict began in 1999. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2003/2004 (London: IISS, 2003), pp. 86-87.
115. For more on the Chechen case, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Russia and Chechnya," in Art and Richardson, Democracy and Counterterrorism.
116. These would include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the National Liberation Army, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.
117. See Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Antiterrorism Cooperation, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated April 8, 2003), Order Code RL31265;
118. and Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, pp. 4-7.
119. Cronin et al., Foreign Terrorist Organizations, p. 92.
120. As Adam Roberts notes, the outbreak of World. War I is a principal example: the Bosnian-Serb student who killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in July 1914 had no Intention of setting off an international cataclysm. See Ratko Parezanin, Mlada Bosna I proi svetski rat [Young Bosnia and the First World War] (Munich: Iskra, 1974)
121. cited in Roberts, "The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective," p. 107 n. 15.
122. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism," p. 66.
123. Coll and Glasser, "Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations."
124. Porter J. Goss, director of central intelligence, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Global Intelligence Challenges, 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy," 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 16, 2005, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/ speeches/2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html.
125. Possible exceptions include the international anarchist movement, which was confined to Russia, Europe, and the United States.
126. David Johnston, Don Van Natta Jr., and Judith Miller, "Qaida's New Links Increase Threats from Far-Flung Sites," New York Times, June 16, 2002. Many commentators have pointed out that al-Qaida is translated as "the base," "the foundation," or even "the method." It was not intended at its founding to be a single structure.
127. Xavier Raufer, "Al-Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 26, No. 6 (November/December 2003), pp. 391-398.
128. For an early analysis of the arguments of both sides, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, Al-Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2003), Order Code RS21529.
129. Central Intelligence Agency, "Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism," CTC 01-40004, March 27, 2001;
130. and Central Intelligence Agency, "Al-Qa'ida Still Well Positioned to Recruit Terrorisis," July 1, 2002, p. 1,
131. both cited in Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 67 n. 78.
132. Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes, especially pp. 126, 130-131;
133. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), especially p. 121;
134. and David Johnson and Don Van Natta Jr., "U.S. Officials See Signs of a Revived al-Qaida," New York Times, May 17, 2003.
135. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 2003/4 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 6.
136. See also "The Worldwide Threat, 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 108th Cong., 2d sess., February 24, 2004, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/ dci_speech_02142004.html.
137. According to Sageman's analysis, operatives have gathered in regional clusters, which he labels "the central staff of al-Qaida," "the Southeast Asian cluster," "the Maghreb cluster," and "the core Arab duster." Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.
138. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Ibid.;
139. and Jeffrey Cozzons, "Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies," Jane's Intelli gence Review, February 1, 2005.
140. Sageman, understanding Terrorist Networks, p. 119. Sageman's book analyzes the patterns of growth of cells involved in past attacks, including vigorous refutation of the thesis that exposure to ideology alone explains the growth of al-Qaida.
141. Sageman, understanding Terrorist Networks, Ibid., p. 178.
142. Jack Kalpakian, "Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March-April 2005), pp. 113-127.
143. Al Jazeera TV, September 10, 2003, cited in Michael Scheuer, "Coalition Warfare: How al-Qaeda Uses the World Islamic Front against Crusaders and Jews, Part I," Terrorism Focus, Vol. 2, No. 7, March 31, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid= 2369530.
144. Paul Pillar, "Counterterrorism after al-Qaida," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 2004), pp. 101-113.
145. Cozzens, "Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategies."
146. Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, especially p. 92.
147. On this point, see Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of al-Qaida and the Global War on Terrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 6 (December 2004), p. 556.
148. On this subject, see Laqueur, Terrorism, especially pp. 3-20;
149. and James Joll, The Second Interna tional, 1889-1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955).
150. Bruce Hoffman, "The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden: The Terrorist as CEO," Atlantic Monthly, April 2003, pp. 26-27.
151. Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks, pp. 50-51.
152. See Douglas Farah and Peter Finn, "Terrorism, Inc.: Al-Qaida Franchises Brand of Violence to Groups across World," Washington Post, November 21, 2003;
153. Daniel Benjamin, "Are the Sparks Catching?" Washington Post, November 23, 2003;
154. and Sebastian Rotella and Richard C. Paddock, "Experts See Major Shift in al-Qaida's Strategy," Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2003.
155. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey, 2003/4, p. 8.
156. "U.S.: Terror Funding Stymied," CBS News, January 11, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/11/terror/main666168.shtml.
157. These are methods of transferring value anonymously, without electronic traceability or paper trails. See Rensselaer Lee, Terrorist Financing: The U.S. and International Response, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 6, 2002), pp. 11-13, Order Code RL31658.
158. For information on informal financing mechanisms and U.S. efforts to control them, see testimony of Assistant Secretary Juan Carlos Zarate for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury, before the House Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., February 16, 2005, http://www.ustreas. gov/press/releases/js2256.htm.
159. For more on illegal and legal globalized networks of financing, see Terrorist Financing, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, October 2002);
160. Update on the Global Campaign against Terrorist Financing, Second Report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, June 15, 2004);
161. Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks (London: Pluto, 2003);
162. Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004);
163. and Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert, eds., Countering the Financing of Global Terrorism (London: Routledge, forthcoming).
164. For more on this phenomenon, see Cronin, "Behind the Curve," pp. 30-58.
165. For an analysis of current terrorist use of the internet, see Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet," Special Report, No. 116 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, March 2004).
166. Gabriel Weimann, Special Report, Ibid., p. 7.
167. Comparable cell-based "immortal" terrorist networks have included the social revolutionary and anarchist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I am indebted to Timothy Hoyt for this observation.
168. See, for example, Corine Hegland, "Global Jihad," National Journal, May 8, 2004, pp. 1396-1402.
169. As Jonathan Monten demonstrates, democratization is a long-standing goal of U.S. foreign policy; with respect to terrorism, however, both the "vindicationists" and the "exemplarists" are missing the point. Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112-156.
170. Nor will withdrawal from occupation in Iraq and Palestine, for example, solve this problem: al-Qaida-associated suicide attacks in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey belie that argument. Sec Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).
171. On Lhe broader significance of using the internet as a means of mobilization, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-mobilization: The New Levée en Masse," Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 77-87.
172. See "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, Support for Terror Wanes among Muslim Publics," July 14, 2005, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248.
173. Among them is Michael Scheuer, author of Anonymous, Imperial Hubris.
174. I have dealt at length with the question of the definition of terrorism elsewhere and will not rehash those arguments here. See, for example Cronin, "Behind the Curve," pp. 32-33.