Lions tamed? An inquiry into the causes of de-radicalization of armed Islamist movements: The case of the Egyptian Islamic Group

Middle East Journal

Volumn 61, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 596-625

  Ashour, Omar ^a,b  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b Inter University Consortium for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies (ICAMES)   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ISLAMISM; POLITICAL IDEOLOGY; POLITICAL VIOLENCE;

AFRICA; EGYPT; NORTH AFRICA;

EID: 36248983071     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/61.4.12     Document Type: Article

References (231)

1. The term "historical leaders" was coined by the Egyptian media and it refers to the IG leadership of the 1970s. Almost all of these leaders were sentenced in the so-called al-Jihad Trials of 1981 following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Most of the historical leaders were still serving their sentences or administratively detained by the regime in 1997. The historical leaders currently represent the majority in the Shura Council of the IG. The leaders who are still alive in 2007 are Karam Zuhdi, Nagih Ibrahim, 'Asim 'Abd al- Majid, 'Essam Dirbalah, Hamdi 'Abd al-Rahman, Usama Hafiz, 'Ali al-Sharif, and Fouad al-Dawalibi.
2. 'Abdu Zinah, "Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya Fi Misr Tulghi Manahijiha Wa Tastabdil Kutub al-Ikhwan Biha" ["The Islamic Group in Egypt Rescinds Its Curricula and Replaces Them with the Brothers' Books"], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 8, 2003, p. 16.
3. The Salafi-Jihadi current is a Sunni-based Islamist ideological trend that combines elements from two major Islamist trends: Salafism and Jihadism. Salafist movements are characterized by their adherence to the teachings of the first three Muslim generations as well as their Sunni-based literal/puritanical interpretation of Islamic sources. Salafist movements can be political (Salafiyya-Jihadiyya) or apolitical (Salafiyya-'ilmiyya - Scholarly-Salafism). Jihadist movements are characterized by their legitimization and frequent use of violence as a method of social and political change, their rejection of both electoral and liberal democracy, as well as their intolerance of sociopolitical rivals.
4. In 2003 and 2004, the IG leadership issued several books criticizing both the ideology and behavior of al-Qa'ida.
5. In general, I shall use the acronyms by which an Islamist group is better known - regardless of which language it reflects. Especially in the cases of Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian groups, the acronyms reflect their French initials. However, acronyms reflecting English initials will be mostly used.
6. Led by the former President as well as Mujahidin leader Burhannudin Rabbani.
7. Led by former Mujahidin leader 'Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, the Union is now known as the Islamic Mission Organization.
8. I use the term "relatively liberal" because this brand of Islamist movements will seem "liberal" when compared only to other brands of Islamist movements. However, they will not look "liberal" when compared to mainstream liberal democratic movements.
9. Terms like radicalization, de-radicalization, and moderation will be defined in the following section.
10. Groups which fall under that section of the definition perform ijtihad and interpret Islamic sources by themselves - producing new teachings that can range from radical (e.g. al-Takfir Wa al-Hijra and GIA's interpretations) to moderate (e.g. Hasan al-Turabi's new fatwas supportive of prayer-leadership by women and marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men).
11. Groups which fall under that section of the definition recycle old interpretations of Islamic Jurisprudence's main sources (Qur'an, Sunna, Ijma', and Qiyas), based on their understanding of those interpretations.
12. Electoral democracy, or "the institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (see Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 269, is contrasted here with liberal democracy (electoral democracy coupled with constitutional liberalism).
13. See Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76 (November/December 1997), pp. 22-43;
14. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999). Liberal democracy includes extensive provisions for protecting minorities against the tyranny of the majority. It also requires the absence of reserved domains of power for certain social groups (like the military or the clergy).
15. For other definitions see Saad Eddine Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 423-453;
16. Emad Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997);
17. Mohammad Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel? Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003);
18. Quintan Wicktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).
19. A militant is defined here as a person who takes up arms in pursuit of a political, social, or ideological cause(s).
20. Both movements fought for the reestablishment of the electoral process and additionally, in the IRP case, for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Tajikistan.
21. Ideologically, those movements define jihad as a mainly violent struggle and perceive it as a continuous sacred duty. For them, fighting seems to be an end by itself.
22. However, in several cases the AIS issued violent threats against civilians, most notably journalists. No operations were ultimately carried though and the AIS did not take responsibility for attacks on civilians. See for example Muhammad Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000), p. 583.
23. Examples of increasing levels of violence would be expanding the selection of targets to include civilians, using indiscriminate violence and, in tactics, using suicide bombings. After 1994, the methods utilized by the Algerian GIA exemplify ths trend.
24. The main example is the Egyptian Islamic Group that - based on their interpretation of Islam - still reject democracy. However, their newly developed ideology de-legitimizes violence and includes a qualified acceptance of the "other."
25. An example of a higher level of moderation is accepting liberal democracy as opposed to electoral democracy.
26. Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups;" Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994);
27. Lisa Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism," in John Esposito, ed., Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997);
28. John Esposito, Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997);
29. Graham Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (March/April 2002), pp. 48-64; Wicktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism.
30. The moderation processes started to be "institutionalized" in the late 1990s - most notably in Egypt with the official Muslim Brothers-Wasat split in 1996 and in Turkey with the split between the Virtue Party (FP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001.
31. Also see Carrie Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 205-228;
32. and Mobilizing Islam: Religious Activism and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia Press, 2002).
33. Also referred to as "frustration-aggression" models, especially in cases of violent radicalism (Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 17).
34. Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
35. Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism, p. 6.
36. Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups;" Hamied Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No.1 (March 1984), pp. 123-144;
37. Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies."
38. The main hypothesis is that Islamists will uphold religious and religio-national identities in response to "cultural imperialism." Also see Esposito, Political Islam; Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement of North Africa (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1997);
39. Saad Eddine Ibrahim, "Challenges for Islam and Democracy," A Lecture Given at the Law Faculty, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, February 19, 2004.
40. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.
41. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 6.
42. Wickham, The Path to Moderation, p. 224.
43. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.
44. That approach was developed and utilized by social movement theorists. See for example James DeNardo, Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985);
45. Doug McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
46. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
47. On Islamism and social movement theory see Wickham, The Path to Moderation;
48. Hafez, Why Muslim Rebel;
49. and Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism.
50. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel.
51. 'Abdu Zinah, "Mu'assyis al-Jama'a al-Islammiya: Nastab'id Ta'sis Hizb Siyasi wa Nad'u al-Dawla Ila al-Tagawob ma'al-Mubadara" ["The Founder of the Islamic Group: We Will Not Establish a Political Party and We Call on the State to Cooperate with the Initiative"], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 22, 2002, p. 1;
52. Karam Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat [River of Memories] (Cairo: Al-Turatb al-Islami, 2003).
53. Karam Zuhdi, "Interview with Karam Zuhdi," Liqa'Khas [Private Meeting], Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, Cairo, August 23, 2006, 12:30 GMT;
54. Islamic Group, "Ba'd al-Taghyir Hal Sa Taqulun Bi Jawaz Dukhul Majlis Al-Sha'ab?" ["After the Transformations Are You Going to Say that Entering the Parliament Is Legitimate?"], http://egyig.com/Public/articles/mobadara/6/4532142/html.
55. Al-Jihad Organization is currently undergoing a process of ideological de-radicalization as well. The process is led by the former commander of that group (1986-1993) Sayyid Imam Al-Sharif (alias 'Abd al-Qadir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and Dr. Fadl). The process is still incomplete due to organizational differences.
56. See for example 'Abdu Zinah, "Qiyadat al-Jihad Dakhil al-Sujun al-Masriyya Ta'kuf 'ala I'dad Bayan Mubadarit Waqf al-'unf" ["The Commanders of al-Jihad inside Egyptian Prisons Are Engaging in Preparing a Communiqué for an Initiative for Ceasing Violence"], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 19, 2007, p. 1.
57. Also, the Libyan Fighting Islamist Group is in the process of negotiating its de-radicalization along the lines of the IG.
58. See Camille al-Tawil, "Mu'taqalun min al-Jama'a Yuridun Ishrak Qadatahum fi al-Kharij fi al-Huwar" ["Detainees from the Group Want to Include their Leaders Abroad in the Dialogue"], Al-Hayat, January 28, 2006, p. 1.
59. In an interview with the former Emir of the GSPC, Hassan Hattab asserted that several factions within the GSPC (which now uses the name of al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami or al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Countries of al-Maghrib or QICM) want to shun violence in return for having their sociopolitical demands met (see Hasan Hattab, " Hassan Hattab: Nurid al-Takhali 'an al-'amal al Musallah Lakin Lana Matalib," ["Hassan Hattab: 'We Want to Give Up Armed Activism... But We Have Demands...'" ], Interview by Allam Bou Ghimrasa, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 15, 2005, p. 6.
60. Due to space and time limitations, I will not attempt to test these variables against potential other variables. This broader project will remain the subject of future research, as will testing the variables on different case-studies to provide a comprehensive framework on the causes of de-radicalization.
61. The "other" is defined here as any social or political actor or entity who/which is not Islamist or who/which is not recognized by the movement(s) under study as "Islamist."
62. Christian Davenport, ed., Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 6.
63. Sabine Carey, "Uncovering the Dynamics of Domestic Conflict: A Time-Series Analysis of Protest and Repression in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa," paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Rearch (ECPR) Joint Sessions, Workshop 9: The Systematic Study of Human Rights Violations, March 2002, p. 6.
64. In other words, external social interaction takes place between an Islamist movement and what it perceives as the "other."
65. For Weber, charisma is based on those exceptional powers that are attributed to the leader(s) because of the unusual transcendental qualities some people see in that/those leader(s).
66. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 23.
67. Hattab, Nuryid al-Takhali, p. 6;
68. Hafez, "Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria," pp. 572-591.
69. For more theoretical distinctions between these two types of leaderships, see L.W. Fry, "Towards a Paradigm of Spiritual Leadership," The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 16 (2005), pp. 619-722
70. and L.W. Fry and L.L. Matherly, "Spritual Leadership and Organizational Performance," paper presented at the August 2006 meeting of the Academy of Management, Atlanta, Georgia.
71. These were younger activists who joined the IG in the late 1970s and early 1980 and who had lighter prison sentences in the 1981-1984 trials of jihadi activists after President Sadat's assassination.
72. Wickham, The Path to Moderation;
73. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam.
74. The argument is that a social movement will update its beliefs and reassess its behavior in reaction to the behavior of their interaction partner(s).
75. Wael 'Uthman, Asrar al-Haraka Al-Tullabiyya, 1968-1975 [The Secrets of the Student Movement, 1968-1975] (Cairo: Madkur, 1976), p. 17.
76. Salah Hashim, "'An Nash'at al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya bi Misr" ["On the Birth of the Islamic Continued from previous page] Group in Egypt"], Moragaat, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2000).
77. Those were 'Abd al-Mun'im Abul Futuh, 'Issam al-Aryan, and Abul 'ila Madi respectively. 'Issam al-Aryan is currently the director of the Political Bureau of the Muslim Brothers. 'Abd al-Mun'im Abul Futuh is a leading member in the same group. Abul 'ila Madi was a leading activist in the MB. In 1996, he resigned from the MB and co-founded the Wasat Party.
78. Makrarn M. Ahmad, "Ahmad Yuhawir al-Qiyadat al-Tarikhiyya lil Jama'a al-Islamiyya fi Sijn al-'Aqrab" ["Ahmad Interviews the Historical Leadership of the Islamic Group in the Scorpion Prison"], Al-Mussawar, June 21, 2002, pp. 4-22.
79. Muntasir Al-Zayat, Al-Jama'at al-Islammiyya: Ru'ya min al-Dakhil [The Islamist Groups: An Insider Perspective] (Cairo: Misr al-Mahrusa, 2005), p. 74.
80. A derivative of the word salaf (predecessors or ancestors), salafism is a school of thought in Sunni Islam that attributes its beliefs to the first three Islamic generations: the sahaba (companions of the Prophet) and the two succeeding generations. Salafism believes that pure Islam was practiced by these first three generations. "Innovations" in religious matters are unacceptable to salafis. Vaguely and broadly defined, those "innovations" could range from modern ideas like democracy to different understandings of Islam like mystical Islam (Sufism) and Shi'ite Islam.
81. Kamal Habib, Al-Haraka al-Islamiyya: Min al-Muwajaha ila al-Muraja'a [The Islamic Movement: From Confrontation to Revision] (Cairo: Madbuli, 2002), p. 30.
82. Habib, Al-Haraka, p. 31.
83. According to the Mithaq (Charter) of the IG, jihad (defined here as armed struggle) is one way to achieve sociopolitical change. The other two means being da'wa (proselytizing) and amr bil ma'ruf wal nahyi 'an al-munkar (ordering virtue and preventing vice - OVPV) The latter method could be violent or non-violent. See Nagih Ibrhaim et al., Mithaq Al-'amal al-Islami [Islamic Action Charter] (Cairo, 1984), p. 16.
84. Al-Zummur was the most senior military officer in the group, a major in the military intelligence. Later on, he held several leading positions in the broader Egyptian jihadi movement including the leadership of the Jihad Organization and a membership in the Shura Council of the IG. During the meeting of September 1981, he staunchly opposed the assassination of Sadat. His opposition was mainly due to pragmatism (See 'Abbud Al-Zummur, Hiwarat wa Wathiq [Dialogues and Documents], Interviews by Ahmad Rajjab (Giza: Markaz al-Hadara lil I'lam wa al-Nashr, 1990).
85. The most famous of Sadat's assassins and practically the leader of the group which carried out the assassination.
86. Tala'at F. Qasim, Masra'Fir'awn Misr [The Death of the Egyptian Pharaoh] (No place listed: No publisher listed, 1993), p. 3.
87. Al-Zayat, Al-Jama'at, pp. 229-235;
88. Habib, Al-Haraka, p. 41.
89. Habib, Al-Haraka, p. 41;
90. See also Hisham Mubarak, Al-Irhabiyyun Qadimun! [The Terrorists are Coming!] (Cairo: al-Mahrousa, 1995), pp. 184-189.
91. 'Abd al-Rahman was sentenced by a US court for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
92. Al-Zayat, Al-Jama'at, p. 221.
93. Mostly from Cairo and al-Sharqiyya Governorate in the Delta region.
94. 'Issam al-Qamary is credited for bringing up this theological argument as well as for most of the work in that document. See al-Jihad Organization, Butlan Wilayat al-Darir [The Invalidity of the Rulership of a Blind Man] (Cairo: No publisher listed, 1984);
95. Hani al-Siba'i, "Al-Islami al-Misri Hani al-Siba'i Yakshif Qisat Intiqal Imarat al-Jihad min Imam ila al-Zawhiri" ["The Egyptian Islamist Hani al-Siba'i Uncovers the Transfer of Leadership of al-Jihad from Imam to al-Zawahiri"], Interview by Camille Al-Tawil, Al-Hayat, September 3, 2002, p. 10
96. Mubarak, Al-Irhabiyun, p. 186.
97. It has to be mentioned that, in most cases, the IG did not practice that ideological preference. IG members have engaged in killing soldiers during the confrontation with the regime in 1981 and between 1992 and 1997. However, they still emphasize that ideological preference (see interview with Yusuf in al-Awwa, al-Jama'a al-Islamiya.) When it came to organizational alliances, however, ideological preference mattered. Al-Jihad has attempted to ally itself with Takfiri groups which, by definition, do not uphold the al-'uzr concept. The IG on the other hand did not consider these groups as Sunni and therefore avoided allying with them due to their stance on the al-'uzr concept.
98. See for example Hisham Mubarak, Al-Irhabiyyun Qadimun!, p. 185.
99. Ibrahim et al., Mithaq, p. 91.
100. Habib, Al-Haraka, p. 33.
101. Authored by Nagib Ibrahim, Asim 'Abd al-Majid, and Essam Dirbalah (all members of the Shura Council).
102. Authored by 'Abd al-'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, former Emir of the IG.
103. Authored by the IG Research Unit.
104. Authored by the IG Research Unit.
105. Authored by Nagih Ibrahim. In 2005, after the ideological and behavioral transformations, he wrote another version of that book to recant his older views and legitimize de-radicalization.
106. Nagih Ibrahim, Interview by Salwa al-'Awwa in Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha fi Misr [The Armed Islamic Group in Egypt] (Cairo: Al-Shuruq, 2006), p. 106;
107. Kamal Habib, Tahawwulat al-Haraka al-Islamiyya wa al-Istratijiyya al-Amirikiyya [The Changes of the Islamist Movement and the American Strategy] (Cairo: Misr al-Mahrousa, 2006), p. 136.
108. Sometimes they are also referred to as "second-generation leaders."
109. 'Abd al-Ghani was also one of the main defendants in the trials of the assassination of Rif'at al-Mahjub, the former speaker of the Egyptian Parliament in 1990.
110. Salwa al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha fi Misr [The A rmed Islamic Group in Egypt] (Cairo: Al-Shuruq, 2006), p. 118;
111. Makram M. Ahmad, Yuhawir, p. 11.
112. By da'wa here I mean calling for and propagating the IG ideology. IG activists usually conflate that kind of da'wa as a call for the "true" Islam.
113. Mamduh A. Yusuf, interview by Salwa al-'Awwa in Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha fi Misr, p. 118.
114. Hence, according to Safwat 'Abd al-Ghani, it was called Qism Himayat al-Da'wa [Protection of the Da'wa Unit]. See interview with 'Abd al-Ghani in al-Awwa, al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 124.
115. Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 119; State Security General, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt.
116. Al-Islambulli is a middle-ranking leader in the IG and the brother of the Khalid al-Islambulli, Sadat's assassin. He had recently joined al-Qai'da with other IG members who were disaffected with the group's ideological and behavioral transformations. See Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 120
117. and, Muhammad Al-Hakayima, "Al-Hakayima Yarud 'ala al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya" ["Al-Hakaiyma Replies Back to the Islamic Group"], Interview by Muhammad Salah, Al-Hayat, September 9, 2006, p. 6.
118. Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 121.
119. Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 117; Former State Security General, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt.
120. Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 117;
121. Habib, Tahawulat, p. 103.
122. That violence was mainly exercised when IG members were trying to change "vices" by "hand" (force) in areas where the IG had a strong presence. The most notable example was preventing belly-dancers and female singers from performing in weddings - an action that clashed with traditional Egyptian customs and led to brawls with the wedding organizers. One of those brawls ended up in a gunfight in which one of the wedding organizers was shot in 1987. See al-'Awwa, al-Jama'a al-Islammiyya, p. 116.
123. Civilian courts as opposed to military and state security courts; the latter two are emergency courts which are widely perceived as unfair and illegitimate.
124. This was a policy that General Zaki Badr introduced in the late 1980s. The emergency law allows the state security and the police forces to detain suspects for two months without being brought to court and formally charged. After two months the detainee has to be brought before a court or released. To avoid that, the state security agency would issue a report every two months saying that the detainee was released but s/he resumed his/her "illegal" activities and therefore was re-detained. The reality was that the detainee was released "bureaucratically" but not practically. Some detainees stayed in prison based on this bureaucratic cycle for more than 10 years.
125. Yusuf, Al-Jama'a, p. 125.
126. With the exception of the period between January 1991 and June 1992, which was relatively peaceful compared to the high-profile assassinations before and afterwards.
127. Dayrut is a small town located in the Assyut Governorate in Upper Egypt. The Dayrut events started as a dispute over a 200LE ($40 US) financial loan between a Muslim and a Copt. The dispute led to a violent clash that left two Muslims and one Copt dead. Thinking in traditional vendetta terms that are widespread in Upper Egypt, IG members interfered to avenge the two Muslims by killing one more Copt. The intervention led to multiple clashes that left 17 Copts dead. The security forces responded with a wide-scale crackdown that included assassinating the IG Emir of Dayrut, Shaykh 'Arafa al-Gami in front of the mosque in which he had just given his Friday sermon. The situation kept on escalating in Upper Egypt until the notorious Luxor massacre of November 1997 (State Security General, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt; Also see interview with Usama Hafiz in Al-Jama'a al-Islammiyya, p. 137.)
128. Fifty-eight tourists were gunned down by IG terrorists at the site.
129. 'Ali 'Abd al-Fattah, Al-Hala al-Diniyya fi Misr [The Religious Situation in Egypt] (Cairo: al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 71.
130. Al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiyya, p. 143.
131. As opposed to systematic torture in state security buildings mainly during investigations or as a form of "revenge."
132. To force possible guerrillas from their hideouts inside these cultivated lands.
133. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 7;
134. al-Zayat, Al-Jama'at, p. 299.
135. Most notably Rifa'i Taha, who headed the Shura Council abroad at that time. As result of Taha's condemnation, he was fired from the position and was replaced by Mustafa Hamza, a supporter of the ceasefire.
136. Most notably Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two man in al-Qai'da's network. See Hashim 'An Nash'at, p. 1.
137. Hashim, 'An Nash'at, p. 6.
138. Usama Rushdi, "Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya wa Khurujiha Min Mu'askar al-'unf" ["The Islamic Group and Its Exit from the Camp of Violence"], Interview by Malek al-Trieky, Qadaya al-Sa'a [Issue of the Hour], Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, October 1, 2005.
139. Usama Hafiz and 'Asim 'Abd al-Majid.
140. The reasons will be addressed in details in the section titled "Potential Causes of De-Radicalization."
141. Mainly to avoid violence and intimidation during the process of "ordering virtue."
142. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat;
143. Karam Zuhdi et. al, Istratijiyat wa Tafjirat al-Qa'ida: al-Akhta'wa al-Akhtar [The Strategy and the Bombings of al-Qa'ida: The Mistakes and Dangers] (Cairo: al-Turath al-Islami, 2002);
144. Zuhdi et al., Tafjirat al-Riyadh: Al-Ahkam wa al-Athar [The Riyadh Bombings: The Rulings and the Effects] (Cairo: al-Turath al-Islami, 2003).
145. Nagih Ibrahim et al., Hidayyat al-Khala'iq bayna al-Ghayat wa al-Wasa'il [Guidance of People between Means and Ends] (Cairo: al-Abikan, 2005), pp. 225-247.
146. http://www.egyig.com.
147. See for example Karam Zuhdi, "Interview with Karam Zuhdi," Liqa' Khas, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, Cairo, August 23, 2006.
148. Some exceptions include the works of Dekemejian and Wyszomirski on the Mahdi in Sudan, Brynjar on the leadership of the Muslim Brothers, and Gentry on the role of leadership within social movements and terrorism studies. Lia Brynjar, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942 (Reading, UK: Garnet, 1998);
149. Richard Dekemejian and Margaret Wyszomirski, "Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi in Sudan," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (March 1972), pp. 193-214;
150. Caron Gentry, "The Relationship between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology and Gender," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 274-293.
151. By "partially," I mean that those attempts were not aiming to stop the violence completely like the ICV. More specifically, those attempts either aimed to stop a specific operation, or to stop "excesses" in using violence, leading to killing or hurting bystanders or neutral civilians. Those attempts aimed as well to cease regime-sponsored violence against the IG and its affiliates.
152. Al-Azhar is a world renowned Islamic institution, mosque, and university. It is considered by many Sunni Muslims to be the most prestigious school of Islamic learning, despite the fact that it was established by the Shi'ite Fatimid dynasty in the 10th century AD.
153. The committee was led by the late Shaykh Muhammad M. al-Sha'rawy, a leading popular cleric from al-Azhar. The committee members were mainly from the Muslim Brothers and other independent moderate Islamists. The lack of secularists in the committee made them take a hostile stance towards the mediation process. State-owned and leftist media outlets criticized the attempt and called on the state to stop negotiating with Islamist terrorists.
154. This led to the sacking of General 'Abd al-Halim Abu Musa, the interior minister who was behind the process.
155. Al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiyya, p. 226.
156. A traditional way to show great respect.
157. Makram A. Ahmad, "Al-Qawa'id Tunaqish Qiyadatiha fi Liman Wadi al-Natrun" ["The Grassroots Debates with Its Leadership in Wadi al-Natur Prison"], Al-Mussawar, June 28, 2002, pp. 1 and 12.
158. Another traditional way to show respect to the leaders.
159. State Security Major, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt.
160. The IG leaders put the number at more than 20,000. For estimates see Makram M. Ahmad, Ahmad Yuhawir, p. 7;
161. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 237.
162. Makram M. Ahmad, "Ahmad Yuhawir Qiyadat al- Jama'a al-Islamiyya Kharij al-Sujun" ["Ahmad Interviews the Leadership of the Islamic Group outside the Prisons"], Al-Mussawar, July 5, 2002, p.7.
163. See Makram M. Ahmad, Ahmad Khawir Qiyadat, pp. 7-17;
164. Zuhdi et. al, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, pp. 116-129. Also at some points, the discussion stalled. In an interview with one of the attendees of the Istiqbal conference in August 2002, he mentioned to the author that the members were so critical of the ideological reform that 'Essam Dirbala, one of the leaders and a Shura Council member, said "ok brothers, should we cancel the initiative?" There was a moment of silence, until one of the IG members from Assyut broke it by saying "carry on Mawlana, we are listening."
165. Zuhdi et at., Istratijiyat wa Taffirat, p. 19;
166. Essam Dirbala, "Al-Ahram Yuhawir 'Essam Dirbala" ["Al-Ahram Interviews Essam Dirbala"], Interview by Ahmad Musa, Al-Ahram, August 26, 2006, p. 16.
167. Taha told the historical leaders that what he really signed was a declaration for supporting Iraq against the UN-US sanctions, not an alliance with Bin Ladin and his Front (Dirbala, al-Ahram, p. 16;
168. Ahmad, Ahmad Yuhawir al-Qiyadat, p. 19;
169. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat).
170. Two of the historical leaders, Zuhdi and Dirbala, described that situation as a "trap" planned by their rivals from al-Jihad (who signed on as constituent members of the Front) to ruin the ICV and drag the IG into a confrontation (Dirbala, Al-Ahram, p. 16;
171. Ahmad, Yuhawir al-Qiyadat, p. 19).
172. However, three well-known leaders refused to accept it and quit from the IG. These were Muhammad al-Islambulli, former member of the Shura Council and the brother of Sadat's assassin; Usama Rushdi, former Emir of Assyut Governorate; and Muhammad al-Hakaiyma, a middle-ranking leader from Aswan City who recently announced that he had joined al-Qa'ida's network, together with al-Islambulli. See Muhammad Al-Hakayima, "Al-Hakayima Yarud 'ala al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya" ["Al-Hakaiyma Replies Back to the Islamic Group"], Interview by Muhammad Salah, Al-Hayat, September 9, 2006, p. 6. As for Taha, he was captured by the Syrian security forces and handed over to Egypt. He did not declare any support for the ICV or sign any of the new IG literature. However, in an interview with Karam Zuhdi, he insisted that Taha is still alive and that the historical leaders are attempting to convince him of the Islamic "legitimacy" of the ideological transformation.
173. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 239.
174. Ahmad, Ahmad Yuhawir Qiyadat al-Jama'a, p. 18; State Security Major, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt.
175. Ahmad, Ahmad Yihawir Qiyadat al-Jama'a, p. 17;
176. Makram M. Ahmad, Huwar ma' Qadat al-Tataruf [A Dialogue with the Leaders of Extremism] (Cairo: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2003), p. 193;
177. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 123;
178. Nagih Ibrahim, Hatmiyyat al-Muwajaha wa Fiqh al-Nata'ij [The Inevitability of Confrontation and the Jurisprudence of Result] (Cairo: Al-Abikan, 2005), pp. 59-60.
179. Indeed, the relationship between the IG and the Algerian FIS is no secret. Several IG leaders had ties with FIS figures in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Muhammad al-Islambulli and his mother have visited Algiers and participated in one of the FIS rallies in 1990, in which they were greeted as heroes by FIS supporters. Talaat Fu'ad Qasim (alias Abu Talal al-Qasimi), a former IG spokesperson, issued several statements supporting the FIS in the 1990s. In his sermons recorded on audio tapes, Qasim prayed for the release of Madani and Belhaij. In 1997, the IG historical leaders issued a statement congratulating 'Abbasi Madani, the FIS leader, for his release from prison. See Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 136.
180. See interview in Ahmad, Hiwar ma' Qadat, p. 92.
181. Ahmad, Hiwar ma'Qadat, p. 93.
182. Saad Ibrahim, "Challenges for Islam and Democracy," A Lecture Given at the Law Faculty, McGill University, Montreal, Canada: February 19, 2004;
183. Saad Ibrahim, interview by author, March 21, 2007, Montreal, Canada.
184. Saad Ibrahim, interview by author, March 21, 2007.
185. Although the new literature merits analysis and discussion, I will not attempt to do that here due to space limitations.
186. Ibrahim et al., Tajdid al-Khitab, p. 17.
187. Ibrahim et al., Tajdid al-Khitab, p. 81.
188. Zuhdi et al., Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 236;
189. Ibrahim, Hidayat al-Khala'iq, pp. 225-249
190. Ibrahim et al., Tajdid al-Khitab. It is worth mentioning that in the old literature of the IG, most of these arguments have been refuted as a form of heresy and/or conspiracy.
191. Zuhdi, Istirajiyat wa Taffirat, p. 64.
192. Usama Hafiz and 'Asim 'Abd al-Majid,Mubadarit Waqf Al-'unf: Ru'ya Waqi'iya wa Nazra Shar'iya [Initiative for Ceasing Violence: A Realistic View and a Legitimate Perspective] (Cairo: Al-Turath al-Islami, 2002), p. 46.
193. The new development here is that the condemnation was directed against some leftists. Usually, the IG would attack the whole ideological camp.
194. One example is Dr. Farag Foda, a leading secular intellectual who was assassinated by IG activists in June 1992.
195. Zuhdi, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 21.
196. The general features of the new ideology are based on the first four books that were mentioned earlier.
197. Zuhdi, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 23.
198. These are the leaders who ran the IG outside the prisons throughout the 1980s and led the confrontation with the regime in the early 1990s.
199. Zuhdi, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 22.
200. Zuhdi, Nahr at-Dhikrayat, p. 25.
201. See interview with Yusuf in Al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 202.
202. Zuhdi, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 202.
203. IG Member, interview by author, September 2002, Cairo, Egypt.
204. See inter-view with Yusuf in Al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 206.
205. The argument in this section is based on empirical observations and inductive analysis. At the core of it, there is an obviously problematic moral element which is not addressed here. However, the argument should not be understood as recommending or supporting state repression or any violations of human rights.
206. Hamdi 'Abd al-Rahman, Nagih Ibrahim, and 'Ali al-Sharif, Taslit al-Adwa' 'ala ma Waqa'a fi al-Jihad min Akhta'[Shedding Lights on What Went Wrong during the Jihad] (Cairo: Al-Turath al- Islami, 2002), p. 66.
207. Which means in this case, the IG's understanding of Islam.
208. For example, former detainees who were held in the Scorpion Prison mention that they were held in solitary cells from 1993 until 1997. In addition to bimonthly beatings and torture, they were not allowed to leave these cells for four years. When they interacted with the outside world in 1997, the last news they had heard about the world was in 1993 (Former IG Detainee, interview by author, October 2002, Cairo, Egypt).
209. I have to mention here that the strategy of "health-oriented" repression inside prisons was not limited to Islamist radicals. It was applied to many political prisoners from different ideological camps. Saad Eddine Ibrahim and Ayman Nour, another liberal politician and presidential candidate in 2005, are among the high-profile victims of that strategy (Saad Ibrahim, interview by author, March 21, 2007).
210. See interview with Yusuf in Al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 145.
211. Where the overwhelming majority of IG members were present.
212. Al-Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 133.
213. That practice was not only observable in the IG case. In 1993, al-Jihad Organization recruited two officers from the air defense army unit. The latter planned to shoot down Mubarak's airplane over Suez City in 1994, but the plot was foiled. The planners were all executed at the orders of a military committee, except for the ones who gave the orders. Those were two well-known imprisoned leaders from the al-Jihad Organization (Former Islamist Leader, interview by author, Cairo, Egypt, July 2002).
214. Former Islamist Leader, interview by author, Cairo, Egypt, July 2002.
215. Zuhdi, Nahr al-Dhikrayat, p. 135.
216. Yusuf in al-'Awwa, Al-Jama'a al-Islammiya, p. 144; IG member, interview by author.
217. The exact time period depends on which prison is in question.
218. For example, Samir al-Arky, one of the IG members who was detained in al-Fayoum prison explains that since January 2000 when the ban on visits was revoked, there were usually two fences between the detainee and his visitors. Given the large numbers of detainees and visitors in the same location at the same time, it was very difficult to hear or to interact with each other. By late October 2001, the detainees were allowed to sit with their families with no fences in between. Al-Arky mentions that when this happened, many detainees went down on their knees and prostrated to perform sujud, an Islamic ritual for thanking God (see Samir al-'Arky, "Rihlat Al-Fayyum... Dhikrayat wa Shujun ["The Fayyum Trip... Memories and Grievances"], Interview by Islamic Group, http://egyig.com/Public/articles/mobadara/6/ 38809650.html.)
219. In 2002, a major from the SSI gave the author of this article the four books of the IG. Since there were a few more copies in the stock, the major asked the author to purchase what was left to finish the stock! In 1990s, the idea of SSI officers selling IG books would have seemed preposterous.
220. Mohammed Salah, "Al-Qahira Tuqir bi-Itlaq A'da'al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya 'ala Duf'at" [Cairo Admits Releasing Islamic Group Members in Groups"], Al-Hayat, April 13, 2006, p. 6.
221. Mohammed Salah, "Al-Sulutat al-Masriyya Tutliq Ithnan min Qadat al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya" ["The Egyptian Authorities Release Two of the Leaders of the Islamic Group"], Al-Hayat, October 3, 2003, p. 1.
222. Salah, "al-Qahira Tuqir" p. 6.
223. See interview with Nagih Ibrahim, "Ibrahim Yakshif al-Sitar 'an Ahdath Akhbar al-Mubadara" ["Ibrahim Unveils the Newest Developments of the Initiative"], Interview by Usama 'Abd al-Azim, http://egyig.com/Public/articles/interview/6/83640472.html.
224. Although the history and the older literature of the IG are not available on it.
225. Ahmad, "Al-Qawa'id Tunaqish," p. 16.
226. Ahmad, "Al-Qawa'id Tunaqish," p. 16.
227. Muntasir Al-Zayat, "Muhami Al-Usuliyyin: Mawqifi Sa'b Fi Bulaq al-Dakrut" ["The Lawyer of the Fundamentalists: My Situation Is Difficult in Bulaq al-Dakrur"], Al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 9, 2005, p. 5.
228. Interview with Karam Zuhdi, Liqa' Khas, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, August 23, 2006.
229. As opposed to the organizational leaders of a group.
230. As emphasized in interviews with the IG leaders.
231. Most notable are the Algerian cases of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salati Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (now renamed as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Countries of al-Maghrib).