Taking emergence seriously: The centrality of circular causality for dynamic systems approaches to development

Human Development

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 66-92

  Witherington, David C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

Circular causality; Development; Dynamic systems; Emergence; Metatheory

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR CHANGE; COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; DYNAMIC SYSTEMS APPROACH; EPISTEMOLOGY; HUMAN; LEARNING ALGORITHM; LEARNING THEORY; ORIENTING RESPONSE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PSYCHODYNAMICS; PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT; ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS; SELF CONCEPT;

EID: 79958743363     PISSN: 0018716X     EISSN: 14230054     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1159/000326814     Document Type: Article

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