Crises as signals of strength: The significance of affect in close allies' relationships

Security Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 238-265

  Eznack, Lucile ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957913293     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2011.572687     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. "Scholars typically view cognitive biases and emotions as undermining rationality. Political
2. scientists typically emphasize the primacy of cognition and allow emotion to play a role only when needed to explain irrational choice."
3. Jonathan Mercer., "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," International Organization 59, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 92.
4. For examples of such literature following the Iraq crisis between France and the United States in 2003.
5. see for instance Roger E. Kanet, "A New U.S. Approach to Europe? The Transatlantic Relationship After Bush," International Politics 45, no. 3 (May 2008): 348-63.
6. Graeme P. Herd and Tuomas Forsberg, "Constructive Transatlantic Strategic Dissonance: Making a Virtue out of a Vice?" International Politics 45, no. 3 (May 2008): 364-81.
7. Charles Kupchan, "The Fourth Age. The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations," CROSSROADS-The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal 3 (2007): 222-29.
8. Michael Cox, "Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia," European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 2 (June 2005): 203-33.
9. Paul Cornish, "NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation," International Affairs 80, no. 1 (January 2004): 63-74.
10. Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics."
11. Recent developments in the international relations literature have in fact been emphasizing the need to take into consideration the possibility of applying the concept of affect-or emotion-(in general) or friendship (in particular) to interstate relations.
12. One can cite Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics. Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 116-56.
13. Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics".
14. Felix Berenskoetter, "Friends, There Are No Friends? An Intimate Reframing of the International," Millennium-Journal of International Studies 35, no. 3 (September 2007): 647-76.
15. Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, "Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics," Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 115-35.
16. Other authors in political and social science are gradually coming to take affect into consideration in their analyses of interstate behavior and politics more generally. Examples of this growing literature include
17. James N. Druckman and Rose McDermott, "Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice," Political Behavior 30, no. 2 (2008): 297-321.
18. Richard Ned Lebow, "Reason, Emotion and Cooperation," International Politics 42, no. 3 (September 2005): 283-313.
19. Rose McDermott, "Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses from the First Decade," Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (April 2004): 289-312.
20. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Rose McDermott, "Crossing No Man's Land: Cooperation from the Trenches," Political Psychology 25, no. 2 (April 2004): 271-87.
21. Sara Ahmed, "Collective Feelings: Or, the Impressions Left by Others," Theory, Culture & Society 21, no. 2 (April 2004): 25-42.
22. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
23. George E. Marcus, "Emotions in Politics," Annual Review of Political Science 3 (June 2000): 221-50.
24. George E. Marcus et al., Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
25. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
26. Thomas J. Scheff, "Emotions and Identity: A Theory of Ethnic Nationalism," in Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig. J. Calhoun (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 277-304.
27. P. E. Digeser, "Friendship Between States," British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 2 (2009): 327-28.
28. For a more developed analysis of this issue
29. see for instance Colin Wight, "State Agency: Social Action Without Human Activity?" Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 269-80.
30. John Vloyantes, apropos Canadian-U.S. relations, talks about "war-forged unity" for instance.
31. John P. Vloyantes, "Roots of Friendship and Friction in Canadian-American Relations," The Western Political Quarterly 10, no. 3 (September 1957): 734.
32. Bially-Mattern, discussing British-U.S. relations, emphasizes "particular events that provided powerful representational moments for trust."
33. Janice Bially-Mattern, Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force (New York: Routledge, 2005), 73.
34. Berenskoetter, "Friends, There Are No Friends?" 670.
35. As stated by Mercer: "Emotion drives in-group cooperation and out-group discrimination. The emotion in identity explains why group members may trust each other and why they may distrust outgroup members. For example, should analysts view alliances between states as instrumental, or should they sometimes view them as reflecting a security community or shared values, beliefs and trust? Instead of running from emotion, recognizing emotion's role in trust and identity may help analysts better understand how alliances might work and how security communities might form."
36. Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," 97.
37. The point here is not to establish a classification of NATO members' relationships according to the exact level of affect that characterizes them, but rather to broadly show how both the level and the type of affect can be different vis-a-vis different relationships. Hence, to mention British-U.S. ties along with French-U.S. ones as representing relatively strongly affectively charged relationships does not mean that they are exactly equivalent. It simply means that they can be considered as good illustration cases of a significant presence of affect in interstate relations. Indeed, despite their tumultuous history, Paris and Washington consider each other as particularly close allies and friends and place a high value on their relationship that is motivated by more than traditional strategic considerations.
38. For more details on the characteristics of the so-called special relationship between the two countries.
39. see for instance Jorgen Rasmussen and James M. McCormick, "British Mass Perceptions of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 515-41.
40. David Reynolds "Rethinking Anglo-American Relations," International Affairs 65, no. 1 (Winter 1988-89): 89-111.
41. I develop this particular dyad further in the last section of this paper.
42. Richard Betts calls NATO a "gentlemen's club for liberal and liberalizing countries of the West."
43. Richard K. Betts, "The Three Faces of NATO," The National Interest online, 10 April 2009, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20944.
44. "Friendship is commonly understood as a relationship satisfying cognitive and emotional needs and characterized by reciprocity, trust, openness, honesty, acceptance and loyalty. Trust and openness is seen as both engaging in intimate self-disclosure and keeping confidential information, while honesty, acceptance and loyalty is linked to authenticity, understanding, and genuine commitment."
45. Berenskoetter, "Friends, There Are No Friends?" 649.
46. "Relational cultures are 'processes, structures and practices that create, express, and sustain personal relationships and the identities of partners' (Wood, 2000, p.77). Much like culture in the broader sense, relational cultures consist of shared meaning systems (i.e., symbolic codes).
47. characteristic interaction routines and rituals.
48. norms and rules that organize, sequence, and control behavior. and role structures that organize situated identities."
49. Brant R. Burleson, Sandra Metts and Michael W. Kirch, "Communication in Close Relationships," in Close Relationships. A Sourcebook, eds., Clyde Hendrick and Susan S. Hendrick (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000), 252.
50. A few authors mentioned some of these elements when describing NATO members' relationships, but without making a clear link with affect or developing their implications for these countries' expectations and behavior. Helene Sjursen for instance talks about "the glue provided by a sense of community history or a sense of common destiny" and the view that "such a community would create expectations of loyalty, a sense of solidarity and a mutual confidence that do not necessarily have much to do with what is 'right' from a moral point of view."
51. Helene Sjursen, "On the Identity of NATO," International Affairs 80, no. 4 (July 2004): 701-3.
52. See also Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4.
53. Janice Bially-Mattern, "The Difference that Language-Power Makes: Solving the Puzzle of the Suez Crisis," in Language, Agency and Politics in a Constructed World, ed. François Debrix (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 143-45.
54. Brooke Harrington and Gary Alan Fine explained how "groups socialize members": "because groups matter to the identity of members, the pressures of group life are likely to carry considerable weight in channeling behavior."
55. Brooke Harrington and Gary Alan Fine, "Opening the "Black Box": Small Groups and Twenty-First Century Sociology," Social Psychological Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2000): 314.
56. Marilyn Brewer also developed this idea, stating that "psychologically, expectations of cooperation and security promote positive attraction toward other ingroup members and motivate adherence to ingroup norms of appearance and behavior that assure that one will be recognized as a good or legitimate ingroup member."
57. Marilynn B. Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" Journal of social Issues 55, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 433.
58. Michael E. Roloff et al., "Reasons for Remaining in a Relationship and Responses to Relational Transgressions," Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 18, no. 3 (June 2001): 362.
59. W. H. Jones et al., "Interpersonal Transgressions and Betrayals," in Behaving Badly. Aversive Behaviors in Interpersonal Relationships, ed. R. M. Kowalski (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2001), 235.
60. "Essentially, betrayal means that one party in a relationship acts in a way that favors his or her own interests at the expense of the other party's interests. In one sense, this behavior implies that the betrayer regards his or her needs as more important than the needs of the partner or the relationship. In a deeper sense, however, betrayal sends a signal about how little the betrayer cares about, or values his or her relationship with, the betrayed partner."
61. Julie Fitness, "Betrayal, Rejection, Revenge, and Forgiveness: An Interpersonal Script Approach," in Interpersonal Rejection, ed. M. R. Leary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2, http://www1.psych.purdue.edu/-willia55/392F-%2706/FitnessBetrayal.pdf.
62. Jones et al., "Interpersonal Transgressions and Betrayals," 235-236.
63. Deviance "refers to socially disapproved behavior, attributes, or conditions that violate acceptable standards of behavior or appearance in a given group."
64. Alex Heckert and Druann Maria Heckert, "A New Typology of Deviance: Integrating Normative and Reactivist Definitions of Deviance," Deviant Behavior 23, no. 5 (September 2002): 451.
65. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 63 (emphasis in original).
66. This paper is part of a larger project that focuses more specifically on the notion of relational repair between close allies and how it becomes possible after a serious dispute.
67. Risse-Kappen mentions "ritualistic behavior to restore the relationship" as a way to "rebuild and to regain the sense of community."
68. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 208. Yet, relational repair may take time and require a certain number of efforts or even sacrifices from the countries' concerned by the crisis. Both may need to cool off and accept, or at least come to understand, each other's actions and perceptions.
69. On the problem of cheap talk in friendly interstate relations.
70. see for instance Yves Viltard, "Que faire de la rh́etorique de l'amitíe en relations internationales," IX Congres de l'Association Française de Science Politique (Toulouse, France: 2007).
71. These two cases of serious dispute among close allies are aimed at illustrating my argument, that is, showing how affect can influence these countries' relationships and their behavior in times of crises. They do not constitute definitive proofs of the validity of my claims, as more empirical work, involving more case studies, would be necessary for this.
72. In both cases, I consider the United States as the offended party, that is, the country that felt betrayed by the behavior of its close ally. Although both Britain in 1956 and France in 2003 also had motives for strong dissatisfaction at Washington's conduct, I believe that it was the latter's overreaction that triggered the crises in the first place.
73. Although this episode of crisis involved both Britain and France, I decided to focus here only on the dispute that took place between the United States and Britain.
74. Bially-Mattern, Ordering International Politics, 61.
75. "Message from President Dwight Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden and Prime Minister Mollet, 30 October 1956," Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, 26 July-31 December 1956, eds. J. P. Glennon and N. J. Noring (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).
76. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., "Statements by Ambassador Lodge in the Security Council, 30 October: Afternoon Session," Department of State Bulletin XXXV, no. 907 (12 November 1956).
77. Several references were made, notably to the common fight against the Soviet Union and the fact that British actions prevented the Western camp from taking advantage of the Soviet's troubles in Eastern Europe.
78. See for instance "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 30 October 1956," FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, 26 July-31 December 1956.
79. "Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, 9 November 1956," FRUS 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, 26 July-31 December 1956.
80. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 30 October 1956," FRUS.
81. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 30 October 1956," FRUS.
82. Bially-Mattern, Ordering International Politics, 79.
83. "On Tuesday, the British and French Governments delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to Israel and Egypt-now followed up by armed attack against Egypt. The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance."
84. "Address by President Eisenhower, delivered to the nation over radio and television, 31 October 1956," Department of State Bulletin XXXV, no. 907 (12 November 1956).
85. Louise Richardson, When Allies Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996): 76.
86. This effort by the United States, along with the consequences of violating the consultation norm for the relationship, was mentioned in a conversation between officials from both countries: "Acting Secretary received Caccia today in response to latter's approach of 21 November on question of consultation with British on Middle Eastern problems. Hoover said he had been surprised by Lloyd's proposal that we now discuss these problems in view of 'blackout' of information from British side over past five weeks. He said we had brought this situation to attention of British Government on several occasions to no effect. Hoover pointed out, however, that British must recognize much must be done if unqualified trust is once again to be established between our two countries."
87. "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, 23 November 1956," FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, 26 July-31 December 1956.
88. The fact that Washington was not informed or consulted by Britain and France about their plans is usually presented as one factor among others to explain the magnitude of U.S. anger. See for instance Richardson, When Allies Differ, 82-85.
89. William I. Hitchcock, "The Ghost of Crises Past: The Troubled Alliance in Historical Perspective," in The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order, eds., Jeffrey Anderson, John G. Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008): 61.
90. In this sense, I agree with Risse-Kappen when he writes: "Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles were not so much upset by the Anglo-French-Israeli use of force itself but by the fact that core allies had deliberately deceived them. The allies had not broken some minor consultation agreements, but had violated fundamental collective understandings constituting the transatlantic community," although I believe that these norms embodied more than the transatlantic community, that is, the uniqueness of the Anglo-American relationship.
91. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 93-94.
92. Richardson, When Allies Differ, 16.
93. "While the US opposition to the allied action was to be expected, the use of coercive power was not. The allies could have agreed to disagree, since no supreme American interests were at stake. The United States could also have confined its opposition to condemnatory action in the UN General Assembly."
94. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 87.
95. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, 30 October 1956," FRUS.
96. "Message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, Washington, 30 October 1956," FRUS.
97. Bially-Mattern argues that during the Suez crisis "we-ness broke down" between Britain and the United States, as "crises are instances of discord during which actors become so alienated from each other that they reject the prevailing shared knowledge among them."
98. Bially-Mattern, Ordering International Politics, 57 and 62.
99. Risse-Kappen, in a similar argument, states that "They felt no longer bound by the alliance rules, since Britain and France were behaving in a way inconsistent with the transatlantic community."
100. Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 84.
101. "Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, 14 November 1956," FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, 26 July-31 December 1956.
102. By early December, Britain had accepted the United States demand for troop withdrawal, and U.S. decision makers mentioned the fact that relational repair was already taking place between the two countries. For instance, on 2 December 1956, Secretary Dulles said: "Recent events have created some strain as between members of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, there have been constructive measures to overcome such differences as have existed, and the coming Council meeting affords an opportunity to rebuild a unity and strength."
103. "Statement by Secretary Dulles, White House, press release dated 2 December," Department of State Bulletin XXXV, no. 911 (12 November 1956).
104. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Dillon's Residence, Paris, 10 December 1956," FRUS.
105. "Address by President Eisenhower, delivered to the nation over radio and television, 31 October 1956."
106. "Statement by Secretary Dulles in the General Assembly, 1 November," Department of State Bulletin XXXV, no. 907 (12 November 1956).
107. Richardson, When Allies Differ, 187.
108. The statements that dealt with the importance of Anglo-American relations were only rarely directly related to the Western alliance as a whole. They were most often focused primarily on the two countries' bilateral relations.
109. "Vice President Richard Cheney Salutes Troops, remarks by the vice president to the American Society of News Editors, 9 April 2003," http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030409-4.html.
110. For these types of arguments, see for instance Henry R. Nau, "Iraq and Previous Transatlantic Crises: Divided by Threat, Not Institutions or Values," in The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order, eds., Jeffrey Anderson, John G. Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008): 90.
111. Charles A. Kupchan, "The Atlantic Order in Transition: The Nature of Change in U.S.-European Relations," in The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order, eds., Jeffrey Anderson, John G. Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008): 121.
112. Kupchan, "The Atlantic Order in Transition," 120.
113. Geir Lundestad, "Toward Transatlantic Drift?" in The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress. US-European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9.
114. During the Vietnam War for instance, France not only denied the U.S. demand for military support, but also adopted an openly hostile attitude toward its ally's actions and positions. While this behavior provoked tensions between the two countries, it did not lead to a crisis comparable to the Iraq war in 2003.
115. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of An Alliance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 46-50.
116. "Interview With Tom Brokaw of NBC News, 24 April 2003," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush, January-June 2003, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14&st=&st1=.
117. Irwin M. Wall, "The French-American War Over Iraq," Brown Journal of World Affairs X, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2004): 132.
118. See also Marc Trachtenberg, "The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance," in The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress. U.S.-European Relations After Iraq, ed. David M. Andrews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 205.
119. "La France n'est pas pacifiste, elle n'est naturellement pas anti-aḿericaine. Elle ne va pas utiliser son droit de veto pour ennuyer les Etats-Unis." "France is not pacifist, it is naturally not anti-American. It will not use its veto to annoy the United States," (author's translation).
120. "Entretien du Pŕesident dela Ŕepublique, M. Jacques Chirac, avec les t́eĺevisions aḿericaines 'CBS' et 'CNN,' Paris, 16 Mars 2003," http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
121. Richard Norton-Taylor, "Threat of War: Analysis: In a Sign of Growing Division, Germany and France Kept U.S. in Dark Over Plan to Avert War," Guardian (London), 9 February 2003.
122. "Nous pensons simplement que ces poĺemiques ne font pas avancer les choses et que le devoir des dirigeants c'est de garder leur sang froid." "We simply believe that these polemics do not move things forward and that the duty of leaders is to keep their cool," (author's translation).
123. "Entretien du ministre des affaireśetrangeres, M. Dominique de Villepin, avec RTL-́emission "le d́ebat du jour," 12 Mai 2003," http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
124. "Interview on Fox News Sunday with Tony Snow, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Washington, DC, 16 March 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/18751.htm.
125. "Il y a des bouff́ees de passion mais je crois que les deux pays, les deux peuples surtout, sont tres conscients des liens tres forts d'amitíe.
126. nous sommes des amis, le pŕesident de la Ŕepublique l'a rappeĺe, nous sommes des allíes et nous le resterons. N'oublions pas, nous avonśet́e aux cˆot́es de nos amis aḿericains dans la guerre d'ind́ependance, ils ont́et́e a nos cˆot́es,-et nous ne l'oublions pas croyez-moi,-dans les deux guerres mondiales, lorsque les choses sont devenues tres difficiles, nous avons toujourśet́e ensemble." "There are bursts of passion but I think both countries, especially the two peoples, are very aware of the strong ties of friendship.
127. we are friends, the president recalled it, we are allies and we will stay so. Let's not forget, we were alongside our American friends in the War of Independence, they were at our side-and we do not forget this believe me,-in both world wars, when things became very difficult, we have always been together," (author's translation). "Entretien du ministre des Affaireśetrangeres, M. Dominique De Villepin avec 'France Inter'-́emission 'Le t́eĺephone sonne,' Paris, 13 Mars 2003," http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
128. Several authors mentioned the strategic importance for the United States of getting Turkey's support so as to open a northern front in the war in Iraq. Ayln G̈uney explained how "By invading Iraq from the north as well as the south, the US and its allies hoped to strike at Saddam Hussein's forces from different directions and quickly overwhelm them."
129. Ayln G̈uney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present," Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 3 (2008): 477.
130. This idea was also regularly emphasized by U.S. decision makers during the dispute, who emphasized in particular how the war would be shorter and less bloody with Turkey's help, as I develop in the next section. Strategic interests were also obviously very high in the crisis that opposed Washington to Paris, as already mentioned above, dealing notably with the number of countries participating in the war effort. As stated by Kupchan: "The implications went well beyond diplomatic symbolism. Had the UN Security Council passed a second resolution authorizing the war, the United States may have been able to amass a much larger military coalition from the outset. In short, the diplomatic actions taken by France and Germany to block the war arguably imposed considerable costs on the United States in terms of both resources and lives." Kupchan, "The Atlantic Order in Transition," 120. Hence, these material costs attributed-at least partly-to the attitude of France greatly resemble the ones mentioned vis-a-vis the behavior of Turkey. This perception of comparable material consequences of the French and Turkish positions is confirmed by the words of Philip Robins: "The absence of a second front exposed Turkey, together with France, to the risk of being made the main US scapegoat had the Iraq war gone badly.
131. Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey Between Copenhagen and Iraq," International Affairs 79, no. 3 (May 2003): 565.
132. Michael M. Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray," World Affairs 167, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 113. For more insight on the history of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, see for instance G̈uney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present."
133. "Turkey-U.S. relations to reshape," Hurriyet Daily News, 5 March 2003.
134. Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey Between Copenhagen and Iraq," 560-62.
135. "The high expectations from Turkey by the USA were best revealed in the words of Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Defense Secretary, who stated that: 'Turkish participation, if it does come to the use of force, is very important in managing the consequences, in producing the result as decisively as possible, and also in helping to make sure that post-war Iraq is a positive force in the region, not a destabilizing one. So, it is very crucial to have Turkey intimately involved in the war-planning process."'
136. G̈uney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey," 477.
137. Hence, the argument according to which this case is not comparable to Suez and Iraq with France in terms of importance of the stakes involved does not hold.
138. Ibid., 478.
139. "Secretary Powell spoke with Turkish Prime Minister Gul this morning. He stressed the importance of reaching a decision very soon on the remaining issues to enable the Turkish parliament to vote on our request."
140. "Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, spokesman, Washington, DC, 19 February 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/17808.htm.
141. G̈uney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey," 479.
142. "The defeat stunned American officials, who had been confident that Turkey's leaders would be able to persuade the members of their party to support the measure."
143. Dexter Filkins, "Threats and Responses: Ankara.
144. Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops," New York Times, 2 March 2003.
145. This issue was clearly expressed by officials from the Defense Department: "Q: You have a military problem, it seems, with Turkey. Do you believe that's now resolved? And how important isit? Wolfowitz: It's not quite resolved. It's at a very critical point. It's important. It will make the whole operation go faster and better for everybody including the Turks, including the Iraqis if Turkey is fully supporting us. But we can accomplish our objectives with or without Turkey. It could save a lot of lives for a lot of people because the shorter the war, the better it is. It's better for Iraqis, it's obviously better for our troops and your troops, it's better for the Turks. And that's a point we've tried to press home with the Turks, that they may not be enthusiastic about a war but if one is going to happen it's much better for Turkey that Turkey participate because it will go more quickly and the end will be a better one.
146. "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sky TV, 25 February 2003," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1953.
147. "Turkey Has A Lot at Stake If It Says No to U.S." Hurriyet Daily News, 3 March 2003.
148. "Senior Defense Officials Interview with Chris Core, WMAL Radio, 4 March 2003," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1999.
149. "Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, spokesman, Washington, DC, 20 May 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/20796.htm.
150. Two days after the Press Briefing in which Richard Boucher mentioned the efforts that were made by the United States to accommodate the positions of other countries, including France, on the Iraqi reconstruction resolution, Powell stated that "Well, I am quite sure France will give a 'yes' vote as my colleague Dominique de Villepin said yesterday, and I think it is a step in the right direction of moving forward together" before adding "But does it mean that the disagreements of the past simply are totally forgotten? No, that was not a very pleasant time for any of us and we have to work our way through that."
151. "Press Conference at the French American Press Club, Secretary Colin L Powell, 22 May 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/20909.htm.
152. "Erdogan: Support for US Not Inevitable," Hurriyet Daily News, 19 February 2003.
153. "This is extortion in the name of alliance,' said one U.S. official."
154. "Ankara Stands Firm on Iraq Demands Despite Mounting U.S. Pressure," Hurriyet Daily News, 23 February 2003.
155. "QUESTION: And does this, assuming that there is no change in the position, does this have any long-term effect on relations between the United States and Turkey? Will you, for example, continue to press European countries to take Turkey into the European Union and so on? MR. BOUCHER: Our fundamental view of Turkey as an ally, as an important nation, as an important part of Europe, is unchanged and we'll continue to work with Turkey in a variety of ways-economic, military, political-as befits our cooperation with an important ally." "Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, spokesman, Washington, DC, 3 March 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18144.htm.
156. "I think, in the short-term, we have damaged our relationship with France." "Interview on Fox News Sunday with Tony Snow, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Washington, DC, 16 March 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/18751.htm.
157. For instance, Gunter explains that "For all of these reasons, then, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament narrowly rejected the proposal to support the United States. The result proved a disaster for the U.S.-Turkish alliance. The United States felt deserted and betrayed by a trusted friend it had long considered a strategic ally. If Turkey proved unwilling to support the United States on such all-important issues as war in Iraq, what good was its strategic location?" Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray," 119.
158. "Let's keep in mind, Turkey took it to their parliament at a time of very high tension and turmoil with a government changing. They were going to do that to support us and they didn't succeed. And theyare going to take it back to their parliament and they are trying to figure out the best way to do that." "Interview by International Wire Services, Secretary Colin L. Powell, Washington, DC, 18 March 2003," http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/18810.htm.
159. "Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz Interview with CNN Turk, 6 May 2003," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2572.
160. See also G̈uney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey," 479.
161. It is to be noticed that, according to the New York Times, there was a clear difference between the public and private statements of U.S. officials in their reactions to the Turkish parliament's negative vote. Judith Miller, "The World.
162. Will Turkey Pay for Its Defiance?" New York Times, 9 March 2003. Yet, in the other Iraq case, as well as during the Suez crisis, the U.S. overreaction was public as well as private.