Framework for the design of physician remuneration methods in primary health care

Social Work in Public Health

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 231-259

  Wranik, Dominika ^a   Durier Copp, Martine ^a  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

financial incentives; health human resources; payment methods; Physician renumeration; primary care

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; HEALTH SERVICES; HEALTH WORKER; INCENTIVE; INCOME; POLICY DEVELOPMENT; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION; POPULATION DENSITY; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; RECRUITMENT (EMPLOYMENT); RURAL AREA;

ARTICLE; CANADA; ECONOMICS; GENERAL PRACTITIONER; HUMAN; MEDICAL FEE; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT;

CANADA; FEES, MEDICAL; HUMANS; PHYSICIANS, PRIMARY CARE; PRIMARY HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT MECHANISMS;

EID: 79957843882     PISSN: 19371918     EISSN: 1937190X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19371911003748968     Document Type: Article

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