Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy

Health Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 9-25

  Philipson, Tomas ^a,b  

^a Irving B Harris Grad Sch Pub P   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Health; Incentive contracts; Moral hazard; Physician

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONTRACT; CONTROLLED STUDY; DIAGNOSTIC ACCURACY; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH SERVICE; HEALTH STATUS; HUMAN; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICAL PRACTICE; MEDICAL RECORD; PATIENT INFORMATION; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE;

CONTRACT SERVICES; COST SHARING; DECISION MAKING; HUMANS; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT MECHANISMS;

EID: 0035142277     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/1099-1050(200101)10:1<9::AID-HEC560>3.0.CO;2-Y     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Issues in the industrial organization of the market for physician services
2. Optimal payment systems for health services
3. Supply-side and demand-side cost sharing in health care
4. Health care payment systems: Cost and quality incentives
5. Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality
6. Demand inducement and the physician/patient relationship
7. Delegated expertise
8. Optimal health insurance and provider payment
9. Health maintenance organizations, financial incentives and physicians judgement