Emergence, Reduction and Supervenience: A Varied Landscape

Foundations of Physics

Volumn 41, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 920-959

  Butterfield, J ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Beth's theorem; Definitional extension; Emergence; Multiple realisability; Nagel; Reduction; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956272979     PISSN: 00159018     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10701-011-9549-0     Document Type: Article

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