The multiple realizability argument against reductionism

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 66, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 542-564

  Sober, Elliott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001539748     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/392754     Document Type: Article

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