Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying

European Economic Review

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 463-479

  Etro, Federico ^a  

^a CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Endogenous market structures; Franchising; Incentive contracts; Screening contracts; Strategic delegation; Tying

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); ECONOMIC STRUCTURE; MONOPOLY; PRODUCTIVITY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 79956081889     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.08.001     Document Type: Article

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